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Part I
Introduction
Information is the global currency of today and nowhere is it more true than in financial
markets. Specialized agencies like Reuters, Bloomberg and Dow Jones invest large sums
to develop the fastest, most accurate and most reliable systems of delivering thousands of
news every day to investors around the world. The sheer volume of news has long exceeded
the capacity of human beings to process it manually but advances in computer linguistics
and text processing open up unique possibilities for a systematic and automated analysis.
Based on these advances, this dissertation deals with the impact of news announcements:
i. on the prices of stocks mentioned in the news,
ii. on the prices of other stocks, and
iii. on the broader market.
Separately, it deals with the question of whether quantifying the search for information can
offer insights about investor uncertainty.
The theoretical backdrop for this kind of research is the famous Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis put forward by Fama (1970), according to which new information is immediately
impounded into stock prices. Consequently, public news should not have any predictive
power for future returns and no strategy formed on the basis of public news should be
systematically profitable. Empirical challenges to its validity are almost as old as the EMH
itself. The roots of research on corporate announcements date back to the seminal paper
of Ball and Brown (1968) and the literature on post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD)
is amongst the largest in any area of accounting and finance. Similar studies have been
performed for dividend initiations and omissions (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995)),
share repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelencq (1995)) as well as stock splits
and reverse splits (Desai and Jain (1997), Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002)) and all have
shown that returns following news announcements are, in fact, predictable.
The main limitation of earlier research is already apparent - it could only look at an-
nouncements either with a strong quantitative component or those, which per se had more
or less clear implications for shareholder value. Otherwise, it was simply not possible to
directly distinguish positive announcements from negative ones. Some authors would use
the market reaction as an indirect measure (Chan (2003)) while others would avoid the
problem altogether and concentrate on news volume like Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) and
more recently Fang and Peress (2009). The situation changed with the popularization of au-
tomated text analysis, which in the finance literature was spearheaded by Paul Tetlock and
his string of papers utilizing the ”bag of words” approach to extract the fraction of negative
words as a quantitative measure of linguistic content of any kind of announcement. His
main findings were that the tone of today’s news helps predict tomorrow’s returns (Tetlock
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(2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008)), that public news acts to resolve
asymmetric information (Tetlock (2010)) and that at least some investors react to stale news
(Tetlock (2011)). Linguistic tone has also been integrated into the earnings literature as a
complementary dimension to (quantitative) earnings surprise and shown to independently
predict PEAD and future earnings (Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2006), Engelberg (2008), De-
mers and Vega (2011)). A variety of methodological improvements to analyzing language
have also been suggested including designing better dictionaries (Loughran and McDonald
(2011)), identifying words, which were associated with price reactions in the past (Jegadeesh
and Wu (2011)) as well as using purpose built software (examples are Diction and Opinion
Finder) or data provided by financial news agencies, with Dow Jones and Thomson Reuters
leading the market for news analytics solutions. The empirical results in this dissertation
are mainly based on data from the Thomson Reuters News Analytics archive, containing
all company-specific announcements, from Reuters and direct corporate news wires, for the
period 2003-2011.
The first contribution of this dissertation is to show that negative news is, broadly
speaking, more informative. This is on one hand apparent when the stylized model of
Tetlock (2010), in which news resolves asymmetric information, is augmented to include
news tone. Similarly, negative news about one company contains more information about
other companies than positive news. Empirically, this translates into a larger increase in
the market beta of the announcing company after negative news. This extends the results
of Patton and Verardo (2012), who first suggested the link between changes in beta and
learning from news, and is well explained by the tendency of companies to withhold negative
news modeled by Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer (2011). Greater impact of negative news
seems related to the fact that periods of bad financial news coincide with periods of increased
interest in the economy. Using internet searches as a proxy for information search provides
clear evidence of this relationship. Another interesting finding concerns the role of news
agencies, which seem more successful at filtering out interesting company announcements
rather than generating stories on their own. Finally, it turns out that company news does
not only affect individual companies. Using a bottom-up approach to construct measures of
aggregate tone and disagreement of news offers significant predictive power for index returns,
realized volatility as well as the variance premium, which was suggested by Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) as a measure of economic uncertainty.
In the following, a summary of the four research papers comprising this dissertation and
the details of their contribution are presented individually.
3
”Measuring economic uncertainty and its impact on the stock market”
In this paper a novel measure of economic uncertainty based on the frequency of internet
searches is proposed. Numerous models in the finance literature argue that economic agents
have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and that economic uncertainty has an
impact on the stock market (see Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)). On the other hand,
studies in economic psychology consistently find that the typical response to uncertainty
is by increasing information search (see Lemieux and Peterson (2011) and the references
therein). Combining these insights, the paper attempts to capture investor uncertainty by
analyzing internet search data available from Google Trends. There are two main advantages
to measuring uncertainty using internet searches. The first one is the comparatively high
frequency. The second one relates to the fact that the data is generated spontaneously and
not by actions having directly to do with financial markets, which should limit endogeneity.
Consistent with intuition, the volume of searches for ”economy” increases after the be-
ginning of the subprime crisis, peaks around the collapse of Lehman Brothers and decreases
until mid 2011. To validate the measure further, it is compared against a peer group of
established indicators of uncertainty (VIX, Variance Premium and the Yield Spread) and
confidence (State Street and Shiller’s Confidence Indices). It is positively correlated with all
other measures of uncertainty and negatively with two out of three measures of confidence.
Of those two, one is aimed at capturing the confidence of individual and the other one of in-
stitutional investors, thus partly addressing the concern that internet searches only capture
the attitudes of individual investors. Changes in the search intensity for ”economy” also
appear to capture the financial impact of uncertainty in a very timely fashion. In the week
following an increase in uncertainty aggregate stock returns are low but reverse in the week
after. Conversely, realized volatility is high in the week after the increase and subsides in the
following week. Both findings are robust and consistent with a scenario in which investors
react to uncertainty first by selling risky assets and demanding a risk premium afterwards.
Another advantage of using internet searches is that they are available internationally and
the original results for the US can be shown to hold in several other markets as well.
”Which news resolves asymmetric information?”
The ultimate goal of this paper is to determine relevant characteristics, which increase
the informativeness of news in the context of resolving asymmetric information. The de-
parting point for the analysis is a model proposed by Tetlock (2010), in which information
flows from informed traders to the uninformed ones via the publication of news. Testable
predictions from this model are smaller return reversals after news days and higher corre-
lation between abnormal turnover and absolute return on news days than on other days.
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Both these effects should be especially strong after highly informative news.
The main contribution to the model is to separate two important dimensions character-
izing company news: its tone and its source. The source can be either the company itself,
when the announcement was published through an outlet such as PR Newswire or Busi-
nesswire, or a news agency like Reuters. Thus, at the daily frequency there can be three
situations: only company news, only agency news or both. Similarly, the daily tone of news
about a company can be either positive, negative or neutral, depending on how it compares
to the distribution of news tone for that company in the previous quarter. The methodology
is then based on comparing return reversal after news days and turnover/return correla-
tions on news days with those on other days. The result is that only news days with both
types of news, where the resulting combination is either negative or neutral produce effects
consistent with the resolution of asymmetric information. One conclusion from this result
is that news release by companies is not very informative unless it is picked up by news
agencies. By the same token, news agencies appear more successful in selecting important
direct company announcements rather than generating own ones.
However, it is not immediately clear why this selection mechanism works only for neutral
and negative news. The answer is provided by looking at other news characteristics, in
particular the total number of words in a news story and the number of words related to
the company the story is about. The first finding here is that when companies release
negative news, it contains less words related to them than positive news. In other words,
good developments are presented in close association with the company, while bad ones are
being explained by external factors. Agency news is significantly shorter in general and
especially for negative and neutral announcements this has the effect of putting the focus
back on the company and making the news more informative. For positive news, where the
company is put in the spotlight anyway, this kind of simple content filtering has no further
effect. The reason why positive news does not resolve asymmetric information in the first
place seems related to the fact that companies are very keen to release positive news, even
if it has little content, but are quite reluctant to release negative news.
”Short-term reactions to news announcements: what do investors learn from them?”
Following up on the findings that news, mainly negative news, provides useful informa-
tion about the announcing companies, this paper investigates the informativeness of news
about one company for other companies in the market. The basic framework for looking at
this problem has been provided in Patton and Verardo (2012) model of learning from news.
If news about one company contains information about other companies, then the stock
price of a portfolio consisting of those other companies, i.e. the market, should move in
the same direction as the stock price of the announcing company. Empirically, this should
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translate into an increase in the market beta of the announcing company. Interestingly, for
a sample of earnings announcements the effect depends on the informativeness of news but
not on the sign, that is positive and negative announcements are equally important.
The situation changes when the model is generalized to the case of voluntary disclosure,
which is the main contribution of this paper. Due to the incentive structure governing the
release of information by managers and the fact that investors cannot determine when man-
agers themselves have learned the news, there will be differences in the timing of positive and
negative news. In particular, positive news is always released immediately, while negative
news is withheld. This is the critical difference to the case of mandatory announcements,
like earnings, where the release date is fixed. From the point of view of learning across
companies, this has the following implications. Given a positive news release from one
company, investors have little reason to believe that other companies have similar positive
news, because such news would have been released already. On the other hand, when one
company releases negative news, it is quite likely that other companies also have negative
news, which has been withheld for strategic reasons. This is the motivation to expect an
increase in beta after negative but not positive news.
Using monthly regressions with stock beta as the dependent variable generates exactly
this kind of pattern. Betas are generally higher in months with news than in other months
but this effect is limited to months with negative news. Also, the volume of news has to be
unusually high for the effect to be meaningful, reflecting the fact that news has become a
very common occurrence. Finally, to confirm the theoretical intuition, months with earnings
announcements exhibit significant increases in beta regardless of the sign of the news.
”Aggregate news tone, stock returns and volatility”
The main contribution of this paper is to construct two novel measures: the aggregate
level of news tone and the aggregate dispersion of news tone. The latter is calculated as
the dispersion of news tone of individual companies around the average for all firms. The
novelty comes on one hand from combining the tone of millions of firm-specific news items
into a single marketwide indicator and on the other hand from looking at both the first and
second moment of news flow. Empirically, it can be shown that higher level of aggregate
news tone is associated with higher economic activity, higher aggregate returns, and lower
aggregate stock volatility, while the aggregate dispersion of news tone has the opposite
effects.
There are two possible explanations for these patterns. Either aggregate measures of
news flow capture high-frequency fluctuations in fundamentals or they proxy for investor
sentiment. Evidence provided in the paper is consistent with the former interpretation. In
particular, the aggregate level of news tone and the aggregate dispersion of news tone are
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highly correlated with fundamental indicators such as the Chicago Fed National Activity
Index but only weakly correlated with the Baker-Wurgler investor sentiment index. How-
ever, this does not mean that news is redundant with respect to fundamentals. In fact, the
predictive power for stock returns and volatility exists even after a broad range of control
variables which reflect economic and financial conditions is accounted for. Moreover, espe-
cially the dispersion of news tone is a significant driver of economic uncertainty, as expressed
in the variance premium of Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009). Thus, the paper offers
evidence that news represents the ”soft” part of fundamentals, reflecting the overall level
and uncertainty about company information, driving rational investor uncertainty.
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Research papers
Research paper 1
Measuring economic uncertainty
and its impact on the stock market
Michal Dzielinski1
1A version of this paper was published in the journal Finance Research Letters:
Dzielinski Michal (2012), ”Measuring economic uncertainty and its impact on the stock market”, Finance
Research Letters, 9(3), 167 - 175
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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel measure of economic uncertainty based on the frequency
of internet searches. The theoretical motivation is offered by findings in economic psychol-
ogy that agents respond to increased uncertainty by intensifying their information search.
The main advantages of using internet searches are broad reach, timeliness and the fact
that they reflect actions, rather than words, which however are not directly related to the
stock market. The search-based uncertainty measure compares well against a peer group of
alternative indicators and is shown to have a significant relationship with aggregate stock
returns and volatility.
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1.1 Introduction
Numerous models in the finance literature argue that economic agents have a preference
for early resolution of uncertainty and that economic uncertainty has impact on the stock
market (Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005), Boguth and Kuehn (2009) and Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) to name just a few). On the other hand, studies in economic
psychology consistently find that the typical response to uncertainty is by increasing infor-
mation search (see e.g. Lemieux and Peterson (2011) and the references therein). Thus,
it would seem natural to measure the uncertainty of investors by analyzing their search
behavior. In this paper I argue that the frequency of internet searches reported by Google
Trends can be used to appropriately capture the investor uncertainty about the state of the
economy and that it has implications for aggregate stock returns and volatility.
The departing point is the conjecture more uncertain investors seek information more
intensively and that this can be represented by the volume of internet searches. The first
part of the argument is substantiated by the psychological evidence mentioned above. The
main task here is identifying the relevant subset of all possible searches. The second part
has to do with the spread and centralization of internet searches. Internet penetration in de-
veloped countries now exceeds 75% of households according to www.internetworldstats.com
and its role for various aspects of life but especially information exchange and retrieval is
unquestionable. Willingly or not, every internet user leaves behind data on what she or he
was looking for every time when using a search engine. If analyzed systematically and on
a large scale, such data would be ideally suited for tracking information seeking activities
in the real world environment. This has become realistic after Google revolutionized inter-
net search technology in the late 90’s, becoming the biggest search engine by June 2000,
first as measured by the number of indexed pages, and soon after also by the number of
users. In recent years it has consistently accounted for an estimated 70% of global search
traffic. Therefore, patterns of searches obtained by Google have a serious claim on repre-
sentativeness. With the launch Google Trends in 2006 this vast universe of data became
publicly available. Google Trends makes it possible to track the relative popularity of any
given search term over time. The dataset goes back to 2004 and is updated weekly. It is
also scaled by the total search traffic, so as to conceal the actual number of Google users,
and presented in the form of a search volume index (SVI). In 2008 a sister application was
launched under the name Google Insights for Search, which includes a useful extension,
BR - Barron’s Confidence Index
OYCinst, OYCind - Yale School of Management Stock Market Confidence Index for institutional and indi-
vidual investors respectively
ST - State Street Confidence Index
SVI - Search Volume Index from Google Trends
VP - variance premium
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allowing filtering the results by category to determine e.g. what users searching for ”apple”
were actually interested in (two of the over 20 categories are ”Computers & Electronics”
and ”Food & Drink”). Based on these two sources I construct a measure to capture the
information seeking of investors and thus their degree of uncertainty.
The are two main advantages to measuring uncertainty using internet searches. The first
one is the comparatively high frequency. The second one relates to the fact that the data
is generated spontaneously and not by actions having directly to do with financial markets,
which should limit endogeneity. One objection often raised against this kind of measures is
that they can, at best, capture the behavior of individual, less sophisticated investors only.
I try to address this concern directly by comparing the Google Trends measure to a peer
group, which also includes indicators specifically designed with institutional investors in
mind. Moreover, focusing on individual investors, even if true, does not make the measure
useless. Such investors can also have a significant impact on the stock market, especially in
volatile periods.
Internet search data have already found applications in the finance literature. They
were used to predict sales (Choi and Varian (2009b)), jobless claims (Choi and Varian
(2009a)), flu outbreaks (Dukic, Lopes, and Polson (2009)), individual investors’ demand
and IPO returns (Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011)) as well as modeling volatility asymmetry
(Dzielinski, Rieger, and Talpsepp (2011)). This paper bears most direct resemblance to Da,
Engelberg, and Gao (2010) where principal component analysis is applied to a number of
economy-related search terms and the resulting index is said to capture investor sentiment.
Though some of the results point in the same direction, the motivation is different. By call-
ing their index a sentiment measure, the authors necessarily imply a degree of irrationality.
In my approach, an increase in searches is a symptom of increased uncertainty, which can
be perfectly rational.
1.2 Internet searches and economic uncertainty
The key issue is how to filter out the relevant content of internet searches, which in the
case of Google Trends boils down to selecting appropriate keywords. One thing to avoid
is hindsight bias. Today it may be well-known that recession, oil price and subprime were
topics of great interest to investors over the past few years (unreported results actually
show that an indicator based on a combination of those does a pretty good job) but back in
2005 the choice would have probably been different. The problem is to find a keyword that
is general and time-invariant, while maintaining sufficient relevance. The word ”economy”
itself seems to be a parsimonious solution. It is definitely sufficiently broad to encompass
all possible sources of economic uncertainty, including the three mentioned above, and also
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to be time independent. On the other hand it appears specific enough to contain noise that
is either relatively small or at least constant over time because it is not used to describe any
other concept, whose popularity might be correlated with the one of interest (this might be
the case for instance with the word ”depression”). ”Economy” should also capture searches
for related words, like ”economic” or ”economies” rather well. In particular, there is no
reason suspect that the propensity of users to search for either ”economic” or ”economy”
is driven by different factors. Indeed, the time series of search volume for ”economy” and
”economic” track each other very closely (not shown) and the correlation between them is
0.94. Other versions of the main keyword, like ”economies”, are associated with negligible
search volumes.
If the assumption of constant noise is correct, the trend component should represent
the relevant part of information seeking. I isolate it by dividing the current value by the
value of the corresponding week one year ago, which also helps deal with the observed
seasonality (Figure 1a). The dynamics of this modified measure is shown in Figure 1b, it is
relatively stable until mid 2007 and increases sharply afterwards. The peak coincides with
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, after which a gradual return to pre-crisis levels takes
place. The last months of the sample show a renewed increase in the index, indicative of
the sovereign debt crisis that unsettled the markets.
I also compare the year-on-year series obtained from Google Trends with the SVI for
”economy” obtained from the Google Insights ”Finance & Insurance >> Investment” cat-
egory. The category assignment is performed based on factors like other keywords used in
the search, other searches performed before and after etc. and should reflect the context
of the searches. Thus, the comparison should verify the initial intuition that year-on-year
changes capture the relevant component of search dynamics for ”economy”. The two series
indeed appear very similar and are also highly correlated (ρ = 0.57) though the Google
Insights SVI is more volatile. Why not use the Google Insights directly in the analysis
then? For one, it is somewhat less convenient to handle due to the fact that each time
series is scaled to its peak (fixed at 100), so in ongoing applications rescaling would be
necessary whenever a new peak appeared. More importantly, it turns out that the Google
Trends year-on-year series actually significantly leads the Google Insights series with quite
a large R-squared, as documented in Table 1. The likely reason is the slight shift in the
weekly time window used for computing the SVI values, which is Monday-Sunday for GT
and Sunday-Saturday for GI. Therefore, the Sunday, which still contributes to the current
week for GT is already part of the next week for GI. Therefore, while acknowledging the
important corroboration provided by Google Insights, I only refer to the Google Trends
year-on-year SVI for ”economy” (GTecon) in further analysis.
There are two other options in the data presentation, which are important to mention
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here. The first one is the regional filter, based on the origin of the query determined from
the user’s IP address. For the initial analysis I use the S&P500 as the financial universe and
to limit the confounding influence of searches from parts of the world unrelated to the US
stock market, I only consider those originating in the US itself, which implicitly assumes that
only domestic investors impact the stock market. However, it is not a significant limitation
in practice since the global SVI for ”economy” does not fundamentally differ from the US
one. The other, more important, option concerns how the data are scaled, either to a fixed
or relative reference frame. The first approach applies the average search traffic in a fixed
time period (generally January 2004) as a benchmark value, while otherwise the average for
the whole specified time period is used. This aspect is again important in the context of
the hindsight bias, since the average for the whole period is something known only at the
end. Therefore, I always use fixed scaling.
I compare the measure derived from search volume to other measures of uncertainty or
confidence, which are available at least at monthly frequency. The expectation is to see a
positive correlation with the former and a negative correlation with the latter type. Based on
their methodology, those other measures can be put into one of two groups. The first group
aims to investigate investors’ opinions directly, by means of a survey. A prime example is
the ”One-year confidence index” published every month by the Yale School of Management,
based on a sample of US institutional (pension fund managers) and wealthy individual
investors. The index reflects the fraction of participants expecting a strictly positive return
on the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the following 12 months averaged over a rolling
window of six months. It is calculated separately for institutional and individual investors.
All other measures fall into the second group and employ some kind of measure of
market activity to proxy for uncertainty or confidence. The most famous is probably the
VIX index of implied volatility, often described as ”investors’ fear gauge”. Another example
is the Barron’s Confidence Index, defined as the ratio of yields on high vs medium grade
corporate bonds with higher values (i.e. tighter spreads) indicating higher confidence. A
different approach is taken by State Street, the world’s biggest institutional custodian.
Using unique data on asset flows it defines a proprietary confidence index, whereby shifts
in institutional holdings towards riskier assets indicate rising confidence. In the finance
literature, an interesting measure was developed by Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009).
It is based on the spread between forward-looking implied variance (derived from the VIX)
and backward-looking realized variance. The higher this so-called variance premium (VP),
the higher the uncertainty.
The survey-based measures deserve praise for directness but they are often criticized for
limited scale (sample size) and possible problems with the honesty of the answers. On the
other hand, the market-based measures are based on actions (this argument is especially
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underscored by State Street) and have a large scale but these actions are likely to be affected
by many factors other than the one in question. GTecon seems to connect the best of both:
it is direct yet based on actions rather than statements, so honesty is not an issue and the
scale is virtually unlimited.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics of all the measures as well as correlations between
them. Only two of the measures from the GTecon peer group are readily available at the
weekly frequency, so I also compute the monthly GTecon for reference. It is aggregated
from weekly values by taking simple averages. Whenever a week is split, it is included in
the later month. The two One-year confidence (OYC) indices and the State Street (ST)
confidence index are taken directly from the websites of their respective providers. The
Barron’s (BR) confidence index (or actually its inverse) is approximated using the yield
spread between Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bond indices obtained from Bloomberg.
I also compute monthly averages of the weekly values to compare with other measures.
Weekly and monthly values of the VIX index are from Datastream. Finally, I am grateful
to Hao Zhou for making the monthly variance premium data available online. The sample
period is Jan 2005 - Jun 2011, except the variance premium, which is available through Dec
2010.
The most volatile measure is the variance premium (mostly because of extreme val-
ues registered during the peak of the financial crisis) followed by the VIX and GTecon.
Other measures fluctuate comparatively little. The correlations first of all generally con-
firm that it is justified to consider confidence as the opposite of uncertainty because the
two types of measures are consistently negatively correlated with each other. Furthermore,
the correlations support GTecon as a reasonable measure of uncertainty. It is positively
and significantly correlated with all other measures of uncertainty, as well as significantly
and negatively correlated with two of the three measures of confidence. The only exception
is OYCinst and the initial reaction might be to say this means that Google Trends has
relevance for the behavior of individual but not institutional investors. However, the two
measures of institutional confidence (OYCinst and ST) are also virtually uncorrelated with
each other. One way to explain this puzzling fact is the discrepancy between words and
deeds mentioned before. However, even assuming both measures yield honest results it is
possible that institutional investors remain confident about the long term outlook, captured
by the OYC measure, while being uncertain right now, as depicted in current portfolio flows
underlying the State Street index. This would also explain why the GTecon measure is pos-
itively correlated with OYCinst. For individual investors, both short and long term would
seem to be tied together (no correlation of OYCind with OYCinst, significant and positive
with ST) which is consistent with them following a simpler, extrapolative market heuristics.
In this context, the correlations between GTecon and the three measures of confidence lend
17
further support to saying that GTecon captures uncertainty of both types of investors.
To confirm the initial findings, I regress aggregate stock returns on changes in the
uncertainty measure. Using changes captures short-term fluctuations in uncertainty (Figure
1c), which should affect short-term returns. The regression is performed on weekly basis
and includes changes in the two other measures of uncertainty available weekly and the
past return as control variables. The Google search frequencies are measured on a Monday-
to-Sunday basis, which is consistent with investors using information from the weekend
during the following week. To avoid overlaps during the weekends, returns are calculated
Monday-to-Monday using opening prices of the S&P500 index:
Rett = β0 + β1 ·∆GTecon,t−1 + β2 ·∆BRt−1 + β3 ·∆V IXt−1 + β4 ·Rett−1 + t (1.1)
The significance of β̂1 in Table 1.3 shows that internet searches do indeed have some exoge-
nous merit in measuring economic uncertainty or otherwise their impact would have been
subsumed by the VIX. This result is consistent with the findings of Da, Engelberg, and Gao
(2010). The economic impact is also large - a one standard deviation change in the index
is associated with a drop in the weekly return of around 0.65%.
One concern relates to β̂1’s negative sign, which seems to run counter to what is generally
postulated as the impact of uncertainty, namely to increase future (expected) returns as
investors demand an uncertainty premium. However, increasing expected returns requires
an adjustment period in which prices have to fall, resulting in negative returns. ∆GTecon
could capture this adjustment thanks to its comparatively high frequency. An indication
that this is the case is given by the fact that the initial negative returns appear to reverse
in week t+ 1.
A much clearer relationship emerges between ∆GTecon and future realized volatility.
Daily values of realized volatility for the S&P500 index, computed from high frequency
returns, are taken from Oxford-Man Institute’s Realized Library. At the time of writing
the downloadable dataset ends in February 2009. Weekly values are computed simply as
the sum of the daily values within a given week. To control for persistence, first differences
of logged weekly values are used in the regression, the right hand side is exactly as in
Eq. 1. Consistent with the adjustment argument, volatility is high in the week following
an increase in uncertainty and dies down in the week after that. The effect is especially
remarkable given that it is not neutralized by implied volatility. Tracking internet searches
would thus appear as a complimentary way to capture the uncertainty of those (probably
less sophisticated) investors who do not have access to the options market but can still
affect the behavior of equity indices.
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The second concern is about the impact of the financial crisis, which covers a significant
part of the sample period. To investigate it, I expand Eq. 1 by a dummy variable indicating
the crisis period and also interact it with all other variables, particularly ∆GTecon to see how
much they are affected. The dates of the financial crisis are necessarily chosen arbitrarily,
since there is no consensus when exactly the crisis happened, or in fact whether it is still
happening. On one hand, the chosen dates reflect the period of extreme fluctuations of all
variables, which is most likely to skew the regression results towards significance. On the
other hand, shifting the starting and end points by several months does not change the
conclusions (not reported). The regression equation therefore becomes:
Rett = β0+β1·∆GTecon,t−1+β·Controls+γ0·Z+γ1·Z·∆GTecon,t−1+γ·Z·Controls+t (1.2)
where:
Z =
1 between May 2007 and June 20090 otherwise.
Panel B of Table 1.3 gives evidence that the explanatory power of the uncertainty
measure for future returns is indeed much higher during the financial crisis. This is under-
standable given that uncertainty is likely to be at its highest (and most influential) during
periods of market turmoil. It is also when an indicator of uncertainty is most useful. The
relationship to future volatility is by contrast virtually unaffected by the crisis, especially
at the shorter horizon. Especially this finding gives further support to measuring economic
uncertainty based on search behavior.
The global reach of internet and Google’s search engine makes an international com-
parison compelling. Following the structure of the regional filter in Google Trends it is
based on search volume for countries and the most popular indices of the respective stock
exchanges. The problem of considering only domestic investors is likely to become more
severe for smaller, open exchanges and a better idea for future applications could be to
take an average of the SVIs from different countries weighted by the presence investors
from those countries have on that stock exchange. However, domestic investors should also
account for part of the variation in returns, so as a first validity check for using internet
searches to measure uncertainty in different countries this crude approach is sufficient.
Another issue, specific to the regional analysis, is language. The Google Trends interface
does include a breakdown of the search volume by languages but this is misleading as it
only relates to the language version of the Google site where the query was initiated and not
the language of the query itself. For instance the resulting SVI for ”economy” for Germany
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and with language set to German only reflects the fact that some users in Germany went
to google.de (rather than google.com) and searched for ”economy” from there. However,
comparing search volumes reveals that German users searching for ”economy” are just
a small fraction of those using the German equivalent term ”Wirtschaft”. Therefore, to
maintain representativeness I use the local language equivalent (also for Japan).
Results in Table 1.4 offer moderate support to the usefulness of the GTecon measure
across countries especially with respect to volatility and in times of economic turbulence.
The latter is not necessarily a big drawback because that is also when uncertainty itself is
most influential. The magnitude of the estimated parameters is always larger for the crisis
period but the estimates are also very noisy. This might on one hand reflect lower precision
of Google search data for those countries or the fact that investors in those countries search
for something else than ”economy” or its direct translation. In the case of UK, which is the
only country with no significant relationship at all, it might also reflect the relatively large
involvement of foreign investors in that market.
1.3 Conclusions
The results of this study successfully establish a novel measure of uncertainty about the
state of the economy, based on the volume of internet searches for the word ”economy”. The
main appeal of using internet searches is that they are generated through the spontaneous
behavior of agents and so have interesting signalling properties. The underlying intuition
derived from economic psychology is that a higher level of uncertainty about the economy
increases the demand for information, which should be reflected in higher volume of internet
searches with economy as their topic. Consistent with this intuition, the volume of searches
for ”economy” increases after the beginning of the subprime crisis, peaks around the collapse
of Lehman Brothers and decreases until mid 2011. It is positively correlated with alternative
measures of uncertainty and negatively with measures of investor confidence, both individual
and institutional. It also appears to capture the financial impact of uncertainty in a very
timely fashion. In the week following an increase in uncertainty aggregate stock returns are
low but reverse in the week after. Conversely, realized volatility is high in the week after
the increase and subsides in the next week. Both findings are robust and consistent with a
scenario in which investors react to uncertainty first by selling risky assets and demanding
a risk premium afterwards.
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Figure 1.1: The evolution of Google searches for ”economy” in the US.
The figure presents the raw Search Volume Index (SVI) for ”economy” in the US (1a) as
well as two transformation used to proxy for uncertainty in the paper:
- the ”year-on-year” series computed by dividing each weekly value by the corresponding
value from one year ago, which deals with seasonality of the raw series (1b)
- the differenced ”year-on-year” series, representing weekly changes in uncertainty (1c)
(a) SVI for ”economy” (Google Trends)
(b) Year-on-year SVI for ”economy” (Google Trends)
(c) Weekly changes in the year-on-year SVI for ”economy” (Google Trends)
Table 1.1: Comparison of the two internet search-based uncertainty measures.
GTecon is the year-to-year Google Trends index of the search volume for ”economy” in
the US. GIecon is the Google Insights index of the search volume for ”economy” in the
US, restricted to the ”Finance&Insurance >> Investment” category. In the vector auto-
regression analysis, each row represents the equation for the respective variable with the
constant and lagged parameters given in columns. The sample period is Jan 2005 to Jun
2011.
Panel 1: descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev. Correlation
GTecon 0.99 0.27 0.57
GIecon 0.17 0.10
Panel 2: VAR analysis
Const. GTecon,t−1 GIecon,t−1 GTecon,t−2 GIecon,t−2 adj.-R2(%)
(t-stat) (t-stat (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
GTecon 0.06** 0.78*** -0.04 0.13* 0.20* 86.0
(2.53) (14.2) (-0.38) (1.81) (1.72)
GIecon -0.01 0.19*** 0.59*** -0.09** 0.14** 69.0
(-0.78) (6.40) (10.9) (-2.45) (2.19)
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Table 1.3: Changes in uncertainty and aggregate market returns and volatility.
The dependent variable is the return on the S%P500 index in week t and t+1 and the respective
weekly realized volatility. The impact of the financial crisis is also considered. t-statistics are
computed using the Newey-West correction for up to 4 lags. *, ** and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: unconditional results
Rett Rett+1 ∆RVt ∆RVt+1
∆GTt−1 -0.0604*** 0.0097 1.18*** -0.63**
( -3.12 ) ( 0.38 ) ( 5.50 ) ( -2.19 )
No. obs. 338 337 216 215
Adj. R2 (%) 6.1 0.1 19.9 2.8
Panel B: conditioning on the financial crisis
Z = 0 Z = 1 Z = 0 Z = 1 Z = 0 Z = 1 Z = 0 Z = 1
∆GTt−1 -0.0194 -0.0807*** -0.0237 0.0276 1.21** 1.14*** -0.55 -0.65**
(-1.33) (-3.29) (-1.35) (0.80) (2.94) (4.69) (-0.86) (-2.02)
No. obs. 113 225 113 224 121 95 120 95
Adj. R2 (%) 8.4 1.4 19.5 3.6
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Table 1.4: Impact of uncertainty across countries.
The same regression as before is performed using returns and realized volatilities of major
indices in five countries other than the US (Australia - ASX200, Canada - TSX, UK -
FTSE100, Germany - DAX30, Japan - Nikkei225). t-statistics are computed using the
Newey-West correction for up to 4 lags. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively.
Australia Canada UK Germany Japan
Returns
Z = 0 -0.0215** -0.0057 -0.0005 -0.0106 -0.0454**
( -2.20 ) ( -0.67 ) (-0.07) (-0.89) (-2.39)
Z = 1 -0.0333** -0.0418 -0.0695 -0.0244 -0.1202
( -1.95 ) ( -1.41 ) ( -1.27 ) ( -0.79 ) ( -1.36 )
No. obs. 339 339 339 339 339
Adj. R2 (%) 3.7 2.6 7.1 4.7 4.8
Realized volatilities
Z = 0 0.47 0.35** -0.05 0.86*** 0.14
( 1.27 ) ( 2.01 ) (-0.11) (2.32) (0.25)
Z = 1 -0.13 1.00** 0.66 1.31** 2.81***
( -0.39 ) ( 2.23 ) ( 1.52 ) ( 2.22 ) ( 3.58 )
No. obs. 216 216 216 216 216
Adj. R2 (%) 15.3 9.8 12.2 16.8 15.7
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Research paper 2
Which news resolves asymmetric
information?
Michal Dzielinski
27
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of the role public news plays
in resolving asymmetric information. Based on three testable predictions developed in
earlier literature and a large dataset of newswire announcements, two novel findings are
established. First of all, the resolution of asymmetric information occurs mainly on news
days featuring announcements both by companies and news agencies. Coverage by a news
agency substitutes for the effect of high turnover, highlighting the important role of news
agencies in selecting newsworthy company news. Secondly, positive news does not resolve
asymmetric information on average, while neutral and negative news does. The mechanism
behind this result seems to be the ”positivity bias” in company news and the failure or
unwillingness of news agencies to properly account for it. The fact that news agencies only
fail to correct the bias in very positive company news links to some recent findings in the
exercise of news ”spin” in order to generate positive coverage.
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2.1 Introduction
The motivation for this study are recent findings linking public financial news to the
resolution of asymmetric information. This is a very important aspect of the news and
financial markets literature, because it addresses the question of whether public news is
informative, in the sense of making information initially possessed only by insiders available
to everyone. Tetlock (2010) proposes a stylized model reflecting exactly this link, in which
signals about future payoffs flow from informed investors, who are however vulnerable to
liquidity shocks, to the uninformed ones via the release of public news. After seeing the
news and extracting the signal, previously uninformed investors are more willing to provide
liquidity, because they can infer the size and sign of the informed traders’ shock and its
impact on expected returns. The model offers four testable hypotheses: i) returns after
news days are positively autocorrelated; ii) the effect is even stronger after news days
characterized by high turnover and iii) the correlation between absolute return and volume
is higher on news days than other days iv) the price impact of order flow should be smaller
on news days. These predictions can be confirmed empirically, in particular the findings for
the first two are that reversals over ten days following news days are significantly smaller
than after no-news days and high turnover reduces reversals even more. In this paper they
can be shown to remain valid also during the recent crisis, underscoring the importance of
news in financial markets.
This paper further argues that news should not be treated as a homogenous group, like
it was done in earlier literature and makes two significant contributions to the analysis of
news and asymmetric information. The first one consists in considering not only stories
from news agencies, Reuters in this case, but also those ’wire’ news, which are released
directly by companies to communicate all kinds of material developments. In fact, many
of the agency announcements are closely related, at least in time, to such direct company
communication, suggesting it is an important basis also for financial reporting. As such,
it is the most comprehensive news dataset used in the finance literature. The ability to
combine stories from different sources leads to the first novel empirical result of the paper
that only news days featuring stories both from the company and the news agency are
followed by significantly smaller reversals compared to the no-news case. This finding offers
an important insight into the role of news agencies in financial markets - they contribute to
the resolution of asymmetric information by selecting newsworthy corporate announcements
to report on rather than by generating influential stories themselves. This conclusion is
supported by two auxiliary findings, the first of them being the apparent substitutability
of news agency coverage and high turnover, which is often considered to be a proxy for
informativeness. High turnover, while significantly decreasing reversal after days with news
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only from companies or agencies, has no effect on reversal after days with news from both
sources. The other piece of evidence comes from studying the abnormal return-turnover
correlation around news days, which peaks already on day t− 1 if day t is a news day with
only agency news. This suggests that the market reacts already ahead of such news, which
necessarily makes them less informative.
The second contribution lies in analyzing the language of the news stories in order to
determine whether positive and negative news performs differently with respect to the res-
olution of asymmetric information. Especially after the beginning of the recent crisis there
has been much discussion about the presence of ”positivity bias” in financial news, due
to companies aiming to present themselves favorably and news agencies colluding with the
companies in order to maintain privileged access to information. A substantial skew towards
positive stories can indeed be found, especially for stories published directly by companies,
and it is also true that positive news days are followed by reversals comparable to no-news
days, suggesting positive news resolve little of the information asymmetry. Furthermore,
while combining company and agency news does significantly impact reversal when the re-
sulting combination is either neutral or negative, this is not true if the combined news is
positive. Following up on this finding highlights another important role for news agencies,
besides story selection, which is unwinding the bias in corporate announcements. Compar-
ing the tone of stories released by companies and news agencies on the same day shows that
the tone of the latter stories is significantly more negative. However, this does not happen
if the company news is very positive. This effect seems well explained by looking at other
characteristics of positive and negative news. Negative news from companies is longer than
positive and contains less words deemed relevant to the company itself. This is consistent
with companies identifying positive developments with own actions and attempting to ”ex-
plain” negative ones with external factors. Agency news on the other hand is much shorter
in this case and contains more words related to the company. It seems that by filtering out
the unrelated content news agencies bring the negative content to the spotlight and make
the news more informative. It is apparent why this simple ”shortening” mechanism cannot
work when the original company announcement is positive as a whole. It also suggests that
financial media is reluctant to interfere with the release of positive news about companies
and also appears to explain why positive news, even from combined sources, does not resolve
asymmetric information.
The above contributions add to the broader literature on the impact of public news
on financial markets by linking the studies of Tetlock (2010), and also Chan (2003) and
Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), which consider news and reversals but do not distinguish on
news tone with the pioneering studies of Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and
Macskassy (2008), where the linguistic analysis of text was first applied to financial news.
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Another contribution to this literature is by utilizing an innovative dataset of machine-
processed news supplied by Reuters. Earlier studies using this data have focused on three
topics. Groß-Klußman and Hautsch (2011) looked at the instantaneous impact of pub-
lic news using high-frequency data. They find strong responses in volatility, volume and
liquidity measures and a mixed picture for returns. Storkenmaier, Wagener, and Wein-
hardt (2012) also construct measures of intraday liquidity and trading activity but focus
on comparing the averages for negative and positive news days to no-news days. They find
that liquidity is significantly lower on negative news days but not significantly higher on
positive ones. Trading activity always increases on news days, regardless of the sentiment.
Finally, Sinha (2010) uses news sentiment to calculate monthly sentiment scores for individ-
ual stocks, which are then used to construct ”news momentum” portfolios. The use of such
machine learning approaches adds to the line of papers, such as Loughran and McDonald
(2011), Jegadeesh and Wu (2011) and Graf (2011), which aim to move beyond counting
general negative words in gauging the content of financial news.
By explicitly separating news originated by news agencies and by companies themselves,
the paper also relates to two further strands of the media and finance literature. One of
them, represented by Solomon (2012), is concerned with news ”spin” exercised by some
companies, which hire investor relations firms apparently in order to promote widespread
coverage of positive announcements. Although I do not include the role of IR firms in
my analysis, the finding that news agencies do not seem to correct downwards the tone
of clearly positive company announcements (while doing exactly that for less positive an-
nouncements) also hints at the tendency of financial media not to interfere with good news
about companies. The other strand analyzes the role of financial media at a more gen-
eral level, with particular focus on whether media or specific journalists can causally affect
trading through their publishing, see Engelberg and Parsons (2011) and Dougal, Engelberg,
Garcia, and Parsons (2012). My results, especially the fact that agency news are significant
only when coupled with company news, hints at the sources of any impact media can have
on the stock market - the selection of newsworthy corporate announcements (and perhaps
modifying their language) rather than the generation of original news.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the data, in
particular the news announcement data, and the sample used in this study in more detail.
Section 3 presents the methodology and the results of the baseline analysis of the three
model predictions. Section 4 investigates the role of news tone, news source and some
further news characteristics in resolving asymmetric information. Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Data and sample selection
I analyze a large dataset of 2.5mln news stories related to over 4’000 US companies
over the period 2003-2011. The source of this data is the Thomson Reuters News An-
alytics archive, which also contains complete information from third party feeds such as
PR Newswire and Business Wire, which are important outlets for companies to communi-
cate directly with investors, bypassing financial journalists. Globally, the archive contains
almost 13mln news announcements for more than 20’000 stocks, roughly 57% of them at-
tributable to Reuters and the rest to direct corporate outlets. To simplify language, all
news released by companies directly to investors are referred to as ’wire’ news (shorthand
for PR Newswire, BusinessWire and other popular outlets) and all news published on one
of the Reuters services as ’agency’. Therefore, I assume that news published by Reuters is
representative for news published by news agencies in general.
Based on the exchange codes for NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX (.N, .O and .A respec-
tively), the US market contributes 34% of the newsflow, making it by far the biggest market
for news. Interestingly, while the US share of wire news decreases over time, it actually
increases for agency news, as shown in Figure 2.1. The fact that the US share of agency
news peaks in 2008 suggests that this interest was to some extent related with the US being
at the center of the financial crisis. However, in 2011 it is still considerably larger than the
US share of global companies.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
The main motivation for using the News Analytics archive, apart from the very compre-
hensive and accurate coverage, is the rich metadata supplied with every news announcement.
This metadata is the output of a detailed linguistic examination developed and maintained
by Thomson Reuters itself. It includes descriptive information such as the precise times-
tamp, the headline, the source, the number of companies mentioned and their identifiers as
well as the total length (in words and in sentences) of the news item. It is worth mentioning
at this point the common practice among news agencies of releasing news in stages rather
at once. Thus one would expect a single story to consists of an alert (usually just the head-
line), a main article and possibly one or more appends, all of which would be separately
recorded in the archive due to having different timestamps. Importantly, each new part
of the story is not issued on a standalone basis but rather stitched (or appended) to the
previously existing body and the complete text is released again. Therefore, statistics like
the number of words reflect the length of the story from the beginning up to its current
state and not just the most recent addition. Individual items making up a single story can
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be linked together using the so-called PNAC number and Figure 2.2 plots the count and
average length of individual news items according to their position in the above mentioned
cycle, as well as per story basis.
[Figure 2.2 about here]
Comparing panels A and B, one can see the difference between the publishing practices
of companies and news agencies. Wire news almost always is issued in one piece, reflecting
the fact that it is for the most part prepared in advance. Agency stories on the other hand
consist of 2.5 items on average and generally include at least one alert and one article.
They are also considerably shorter than wire news. The above insights are relevant because
the number of individual news items has previously been suggested as a proxy for the
thoroughness and informativeness of a given news story, see Tetlock (2010).
The most important metadata is analytical and focuses on trying to grasp the content
of the announcements. The key variables in this respect are the tone of the announcement
and its relevance for a particular company. The relevance score, which is between 0 and 1,
measures the strength of the association between the news item and the company, where
the maximum relevance is generally reserved for news where the company is mentioned
directly in the headline. The tone is a discrete variable with three possible values: negative
(-1), neutral (0) or positive (+1). Neutral means that neither a negative not a positive
assignment could be made with sufficient confidence. The measurement of relevance and of
the news tone is performed fully automatically. The algorithm developed for this purpose by
Thomson Reuters belongs to the next generation of text processing tools and goes beyond
the ”bag of words” approach and aims to extract syntactic relationships, identifying words
as subject, predicate or object. Such algorithms can be either deductive, meaning they
follow explicit rules on how to parse the text which have to be defined in advance, or
inductive in which case a learning set of evaluated texts has to be supplied from which
the algorithm attempts to read the rules applied to all subsequent items. Both approaches
can also be combined and improvements in accuracy achievable by introducing syntax are
significant. Also, contrary to what is sometimes said, syntactic approaches are no more
subjective than ”bag of words”. In fact, surveys of methods of content analysis assign all
of them to the family of ”supervised approaches”, indicating human involvement in their
design. This is because the dictionaries, which are behind any ”bag of words” analysis have
to be created by humans. Even inductive algorithms offer a fair degree of inter-subjective
reliability, because the learning sets are always evaluated by more than one person and the
results of learning are only accepted when the agreement between the instructors and the
machine but also among the instructors themselves reaches a certain, appropriately high
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threshold. In the News Analytics archive this is reflected by three ”tone probability” scores,
which show how likely each news item was to receive one of the three tone labels: positive,
neutral or negative (the one assigned is simply the one with the highest probability).
Breaking down the stories by tone, year and source reveals a significant bias among the
wire announcements, with positive stories accounting for 60% of all stories even during
the financial crisis. There is a slight increase in the number of negative stories over time
but it does not even keep up with the overall growth in news volume. Agency stories by
contrast are more balanced and more reflective of the economic cycle, with negative stories
dominating during bear market periods. There is also a marked increase in the number of
neutral stories over time, possibly reflecting one of the recent criticisms of financial media
that they focus on aggregating third-party opinions instead of contributing opinions them-
selves. The analysis of aggregate news flow thus motivates treating agency and wire news
separately, due to the important differences found between the two categories.
[Figure 2.3 about here]
Ultimately, I am interested in news about individual stocks for which it is possible to
obtain pricing and accounting information. Therefore, I match Reuters Instrument Codes
(RICs), which are the primary identifier in the news dataset, to CRSP permanent numbers
(PERMNOs), based on historical CUSIPs. Due to changes in either CUSIP or RIC, as a re-
sult of corporate actions, listing on a different exchange etc., multiple matches are possible.
I only accept those, where the same PERMNO is matched to more than one RIC but not
the other way round. This is to avoid double-counting news by assigning it to two or more
companies. Following this procedure, I am able to match roughly 80% of the distinct RICs
and stories to CRSP securities. This is a reasonably high proportion and because the ratio
for stocks and newsflow is comparable, it does not seem to discriminate small stocks. The
quality of the matching is consistent over time and approximately equally high for agency
and wire announcements (see Figure 2.4).
[Figure 2.4 about here]
The last transformation involves aggregating all stories released within the same trading
day to match the daily frequency of stock returns. For this purpose I develop the following
score, which basically weighs the tone of each story with the probability of its assignment
and divides by the number of stories:
Tone =
∑
1 · probpos +
∑
(−1) · probneg
npos + nneut + nneg
∈ [−1; 1] (2.1)
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Given that most of the results in the paper are for daily frequency, it is very important to
avoid any kind of look-ahead bias. To best reflect the information set available to investors,
news which arrived after the close of day t is shifted to the next trading day, thus Monday
news includes stories from the weekend and similarly for trading days following public
holidays.
For the sample selection, I apply the same filters as Tetlock (2010) and retain only
company-days for which the most recent closing price was above $5 and the stock has
traded on all of the preceding 60 days. After the screening there are 5’507’259 observations
for 4’428 distinct stocks and 918’774 of them are news days. To take into account the
importance of earnings announcements, I collect quarterly earnings dates from IBES and
cross-check them with Compustat to make sure they are correctly identified. Subsequently,
announcements which happened after market close (the majority in later years) are pushed
to the following trading day and matched with general dataset. Earnings announcements
account for 48’235 of the news days over the sample period.
2.3 Methodology
To study how news with different characteristics impact information asymmetry, I make
use of the basic predictions of the stylized model of Tetlock (2010). I focus on the first three
predictions, which can be examined using daily data.:
1. news reduces return reversals
2. high-turnover news reduces reversal even more
3. the correlation between absolute return and turnover is higher in the presence of news
The first two prediction are incorporated in a regression setup, where the excess return
of firm i on day t is used to predict its excess return over the days [t+2:t+10]. The effect of
news is modeled as an interaction term between day t excess return and a dummy variable
equal to one if day t was a news day and zero otherwise. Contrary to Tetlock (2010),
I do not demean the news dummy as to make the interpretation of the coefficient more
straightforward. The regression also includes interactions between: day t excess return and
abnormal turnover on day t; excess return, abnormal turnover and news (second prediction
above) as well as news and abnormal turnover. The following control variables are also
included: size, book-to-market ratio, abnormal turnover, past return and past volatility.
exreti,t+2:t+10 = αt + β1 · exreti,t + β2 · newsi,t · exreti,t + β3 · newsi,t · abturni,t+
+ β4 · newsi,t · abturni,t · exreti,t + controlsi,t + i,t
(2.2)
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The definitions of all variables follow standards widely accepted in the literature. Excess
return is the company’s raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted market return. For the
ten-day horizon this is computed as the ratio of stock prices at the end and the beginning
of the period minus the ratio of the respective value-weighted index levels, which is a more
accurate measure than the sum of daily returns. Turnover is calculated as the ratio of daily
shares volume and shares outstanding. To reduce the skewness of the turnover distribution
I use logarithms and to avoid the problem of zero turnover I follow the method applied in
Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) and add a small positive constant1 to each raw
turnover value. Finally, abnormal turnover is the difference between log turnover on day
t and the 60-day moving average of log turnover. Including abnormal turnover also as a
control variable if motivated by the findings of Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001). Size
is the log of market capitalization at the end of the previous month. Book-to-market ratio
is computed at the end of June each year, using the end-of-month market capitalization and
book equity for the previous year, as in Fama and French (1993). Momentum is the raw
return over the past 12 months, skipping the most recent month. Past volatility follows the
definition of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) being the standard deviation of daily
returns over the past 21 days.
I estimate the coefficients using a single OLS regression with day fixed effects, to allow for
a time-varying component of excess returns, and standard errors clustered by firm and day,
which is the best way to control for two-dimensional correlation of residuals according to
Petersen (2009). The within-firm correlation is to some extent hardwired into the regression
because the dependent variable is measured over overlapping 9-day periods. There is likely
to still be some within-day correlation, even after taking out market-wide shocks with the
fixed effects, e.g. due to the co-movement of stocks from the same industry. Clustered
standard errors are robust to arbitrary correlation structure within the clusters, and thus
suitable for the task.
The results in Table 2.1 closely reproduce those of Tetlock (2010) in terms of the signs of
the variables and their significance. The most important finding is that news significantly
reduces reversal. To gauge the magnitude of this reduction, one can combine the coefficients
on Exret∗News, Exret∗Abturn, Exret∗News∗Abturn together with the average values of
Abturn on news and no-news days and compute the reversal for those two categories respec-
tively. The proportion of day t excess return reversed over days t+ 2 till t+ 10, conditional
on day t being a no-news day, is 4.2%, somewhat smaller than the 10.2% reported by Tetlock
(2010). However, it is much closer to the ∼ 7% he reports for the second part of his sample
1The magnitude of this constant, 0.00000255, is chosen as to make the distribution of turnover closer to
normal, see e.g. Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986) for the argument
36
(1997-2007), which is more comparable to my sample period (2003-2011)2. By contrast, the
reversal after news days amounts to 1.3% of day 0 excess return i.e. less than one third of
what it is after no-news days. It is also true that news accompanied by high turnover have
an even stronger effect on reversal. Reversal shrinks to just 80bp of day 0 return after high
turnover news days, where high is defined as the 90th percentile of the turnover distribution
for news days. Thus, as predicted by the model, turnover serves as a proxy to distinguish
between informative and uninformative news stories. This interpretation is supported when
earnings and non-earnings news are considered separately in the regression3. Earnings news
are identified by matching news days to earnings announcement dates provided in IBES.
The news in this group represent probably the most important of all company announce-
ments. Consequently, they have a very large impact on reversals, in fact there is positive
return autocorrelation after such news, consistent with the post-earnings drift literature,
which does not further depend on turnover. By contrast, the impact of non-earnings news,
which are much more heterogenous with respect to their importance, does significantly in-
crease with turnover.
[Table 2.1 about here]
The results mostly hold in subsamples roughly corresponding to the period before and
after the onset financial crisis. This is an important result, because not many standard
asset pricing relationships hold during the crisis4. The effect of news appears to be smaller
(though still significant at the 10% level) relative to no-news reversal during the crisis, sug-
gesting that news was resolving less asymmetric information at that highly uncertain time.
This is probably because there was a lot more confusion not just among investors but also
news agencies. Accordingly, turnover is a much more significant proxy for informativeness
during the financial crisis.
Other variables also return coefficients in line with expectations. The return-turnover
interaction, Exret∗Abturn is insignificant, much like in the second subsample of Tetlock
(2010). The same applies to the return-size interaction. Among the usual control variables,
size and momentum, are strongly affected by the financial crisis, which does not come as a
surprise. Especially momentum changes from significantly positive to significantly negative
after the beginning of the crisis. On the other hand, the value book-to-market and turnover
effects appear robust in subsamples.
2The apparent decrease in the magnitude of daily reversal is also visible when comparing the pre- and
post-2008 subsamples.
3Technically this involves replacing the single dummy for all news with two dummies, one for earnings
and one for non-earnings news.
4For instance there is no size effect in the 2008-2011 subsample and the momentum effect actually switches
signs.
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Estimating the baseline specification with the Fama-Macbeth two-step procedure used
originally in Tetlock (2010) leads to almost identical results. However, this approach, being
based on averaging coefficients from daily cross-sectional regressions, has one serious limita-
tion once news categories are introduced - there might be zero news items from a particular
category on a given day. One could in that case treat this particular estimate as missing,
resulting in time series of different length for different variables, or drop the entire day from
the sample. Neither is a desirable outcome and it is only aggravated as the categories become
more differentiated and the proportion of zero-news days grows. The single regression does
not suffer from this problem and is therefore the preferred approach for the detailed analysis.
[Figure 2.5 about here]
The final prediction of the model states that the correlation between absolute return and
trading volume increases when news is released. Empirically, I construct event time plots
of the correlation between absolute excess return and log abnormal turnover across all news
events on the event day (day 0) itself as well as up to ten days before and after. In Figure
2.5 the spike at 0 is very prominent, while the control group for which day 0 is chosen to
be a no-news day shows no such clear pattern over the event window. The apparent slight
drop in correlation on day 0 is most likely due to the fact that for the control group day
0 is by definition a no-news day, while any other day in the event window can be either a
news or no-news day. The magnitude of the increase in correlation should be proportional
to the informativeness of the news, so in the detailed analysis I construct similar plots for
all the news categories for which I estimate the OLS regression.
To relate the role of news to the characteristics of companies an their information en-
vironment, I estimate the baseline regression in Eq. 2.2 separately in subsamples of stocks
sorted on size, book-to-market, past return, analyst coverage, analyst dispersion and in-
stitutional ownership. The first three characteristics have already been used as control
variables in the original estimation but the idea here is to examine their interaction effects
with news. The latter three characteristics are intended to capture availability, consistency
and ability to process information respectively. Especially the role of institutional share-
holders as proxy for informed traders seems especially relevant in light of the structure of
the theoretical model. The ranking are updated every quarter (at the end of June each year
for book-to-market) and tercile breakpoints are used. Given that all other characteristics
correlate positively with size, those rankings are size-adjusted by first computing tercile
breakpoints for a given characteristic in each size tercile and then pooling observations
together across size terciles. Thus, the bottom tercile of e.g. institutional ownership will
contain the one third of stocks with the lowest fraction of institutional holdings from all
38
size terciles.
Results for the individual subsamples suggest that the resolution of asymmetric infor-
mation through public news does not depend on the availability or consistency of analyst
coverage (Panels D and E of Table 2.3). On the other hand, the impact of news on reversal
varies significantly with size, past return and institutional ownership (Panels A, C and F).
It appears reasonable that the effect of news is insignificant among stocks with little insti-
tutional shareholders for which the main mechanism of resolving information asymmetry
through public news - passing information from informed traders to the uniformed - is likely
to be weaker due to the scarcity of informed traders overall. For stocks with a medium and
high share of institutional owners, the effect is highly significant. The rankings on size and
past return offer interesting hints as to which types of news are likely to play a larger role
in resolving asymmetric information. On one hand, the fact that in the group of stocks
with highest past returns there is no significant effect suggests that positive news is less
informative than negative news, because past winners also have the most positive coverage.
On the other hand, the insignificance of the estimates among largest stocks points to the
source of the news as an important factor. This is because small and big stocks have quite
a different structure of newsflow, with a much higher share of agency-originated news in
the latter group. Liquidity is less likely to be an issue, since the effects of news is actually
stronger among more liquid stocks. Thus, both source and tone seem important for the
role of news in resolving asymmetric information and will be examined directly in the next
section.
2.4 News source, news tone and asymmetric information
Given that news is found to resolve asymmetric information, it is natural to ask whether
all news is equal in this respect or whether there are differences. In essence, the question is
about the informativeness of different types of news. Tetlock (2010) considers the number
of individual news items per story for this purpose, while Tetlock (2011) focuses on the news
staleness. Neither of them however differentiates between positive and negative tone nor
the source of the news, although these distinctions seem to be at the core of the different
factors and incentives shaping the role of financial news.
On one hand, news originated by the companies themselves and usually disseminated
through channels like the PR Newswire and Business Wire has the most potential to contain
genuinely new information, because companies are best informed about their own business.
However, they also have incentives to present themselves favorably. On one hand, the ”mate-
riality” threshold companies have for releasing positive news is likely to be much lower than
for negative news. This is the case of endogenous disclosure modeled by Acharya, DeMarzo,
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and Kremer (2011). On the other hand, even when forced to disclose bad news, companies
might be inclined to relativize the negative content by focusing e.g. on ways to overcome
currently experienced difficulties, rather than the difficulties themselves. The tendency to
publicize every positive development coupled with watering down bad announcements could
act to reduce the average informativeness of company-originated news, especially good news.
The other important actors in the business of financial reporting are the news agencies
like Reuters or Bloomberg, whose reputation is built on delivering timely and accurate
information to millions of investors worldwide. In practice they face a delicate balancing
act. On one hand, merely passing on company-originated announcements would not justify
the expensive subscriptions paid by the clients, so the agencies are expected to excel at
picking the most important news. Ideally, they would also conduct independent critical
investigations but this is often impossible without information that only the companies
themselves can provide. As a result, news agencies necessarily rely on good relationships
with companies but companies might be reluctant to provide information if it was to be
used for negative coverage. Thus, there could also be a tendency towards positive coverage.
In fact, Solomon (2012) shows that investor relations firms hired by some companies can
successfully increase the number of articles in the financial press following positive corporate
announcements.
To investigate these two dimensions, I first categorize all news days into positive, neu-
tral and negative in a manner similar to Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008).
Specifically, a news day is deemed positive (negative) if the weighted average news tone on
that day falls in the upper (lower) quartile of the previous quarter’s distribution and it is
deemed neutral if falls in between the quartiles. This procedure leads to the loss of one
calendar quarter of data but takes into account secular trends in the overall tone, which
are expected to be quite pronounced given that the stock market went from a very strong
bull to a very deep bear market in this period. Figure 2.6 plots the quarterly breakpoints,
showing considerable variation in the lower breakpoint, which drops from a high of 0 in
2006 and 2007 to a low of -0.34 in early 2009. Interestingly, the upper breakpoint under-
goes much smaller swings, indicating that at least part of the newsflow was remarkably and
consistently positive even during the financial crisis. Figure 2.6 also confirms that the bias
in the distribution of individual news stories carries over to the distribution of news days.
The fact that the lower quartile is just slightly below zero most of the time means that days
with basically neutral stories were already among the worst 25% by tone.
[Figure 2.6 about here]
Separately, I label news days as ’wire’ if they contain only news that was originally
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published on PR Newswire, Business Wire or one of similar direct corporate channels or as
’agency’ if the news came from one of the Reuters feeds. For news days there is also the
third possibility that both types of news can also appear over the course of the same day.
In this case I tend to assume that company and agency news are contentwise related.
To test for differences with respect to news tone, I first estimate the regression in Eq.
2.2 replacing the news dummy with three dummies for positive, neutral and negative news
days respectively. The upper left section of Table 2.4 reports the key coefficients describ-
ing the relationship between tone and information asymmetry. The insignificant coefficient
on Exret∗News for positive news reveals that on average it does not reduce return re-
versals, suggesting it contributes little to resolving asymmetric information. On the other
hand, the coefficients for neutral and especially negative news are both positive and signifi-
cant. The significance of the coefficients on Exret∗News∗Abturn appear complementary to
Exret∗News, underscoring the importance of turnover as a proxy for informativeness when
the average piece of news is not very informative, as is apparently the case with positive
news. These conclusions are supported by examining the absolute return-turnover correla-
tions in Figure 2.7. There is still a moderate increase in correlation for positive news days,
indicating that at least some of them are indeed informative. Negative and neutral news
both have a much bigger impact and there are no further significant differences between
these two groups.
[Table 2.4 about here]
Similar differences emerge when categorizing news by source. Looking at the upper
right section of Table 2.4, the insignificant coefficients on Exret∗News for agency and wire
news days suggest that neither resolves asymmetric information when released on its own.
However, when both are combined, the impact on return reversal is significant. In fact,
there is no reversal at all after news days with stories from both sources. This finding sheds
some light on the role of news agencies in financial markets, which appears to be primarily
identifying important company announcements rather than generating their own stories.
The fact that the coefficient on the triple interaction term for agency and wire news days
is significant and positive, while being insignificant for the ’both’ group supports this view.
To the extent that high turnover helps distinguish between informative and uninformative
news, agency coverage of a corporate announcement seems to have the same effect. The
correlation plots in Figure 2.7 offer an additional insight into why agency stories, which are
not accompanied by wire news, might be uninformative - the market appears to move ahead
of them. The spike in absolute return-turnover correlation happens already one day before
a typical agency-only news day. It is true that the decline in correlation following the spike
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is slowed down by the occurrence of agency-only news but the overall impact is below that
on days featuring news both from companies and agencies. One interpretation would be
that in the absence of new company events, the news agencies tend to report about stock
market movements, thus creating the apparent lag.
[Figure 2.7 about here]
Given the evidence on the positive skew in wire news, it is compelling to ask whether the
effects discussed in the previous two paragraphs are in fact overlapping, that is whether the
lack of significance documented for wire news is due to them for the large part positive and
vice versa. To this end I sort all news days first by tone category and within each of those
categories by the source of the news. The results in Panel B of Table 2.4 show that these
are distinct effects. Although it is true that positive wire news does not resolve asymmetric
information when released alone, the same applies when it is neutral or negative. Conversely,
the combination of agency and wire news does seem to resolve asymmetric information only
when it is overall neutral or negative. This finding is supported by the correlation analysis
as well. Though the absolute return-turnover correlation does feature a spike on day 0
for positive news days in the ’both’ category, the spike is much smaller compared to the
neutral and negative cases. This raises the question whether the role of news agencies is
not only in identifying important corporate announcements but also ”toning them down”
and filtering out the excessively positive content or making more clear the negative aspects
of the original release.
To answer it one could look at the tone of individual stories released on the wire and by
agencies, if both appeared on the same day. Looking at the right hand side of Panel C in
Table 2.4 confirms that agency stories are substantially less positive than contemporaneous
stories on direct wires. There is no such difference if wire and agency stories are released
alone, suggesting that this is not due to a secular difference in language used by companies
and agencies. However, it is important to observe that this ”toning down” effect of agency
news works only if the wire news itself was somewhat negative or at least neutral. For
clearly positive wire news, agency news tends to follow suit thus leading to the whole news
day also being categorized as positive. It is remarkable that this is also the only case where
combined wire and agency news do not contribute to resolving asymmetric information.
Two possible mechanism could explain this finding. It could either be that for these clearly
positive wire news the agencies are subject to spin or they tend to simply relay the original
company announcement. Evidence of the first mechanism was presented by Solomon (2012)
but there is also evidence in support of the second one, as will be shown in subsection 2.4.2.
Either way, news agencies in the face of positive wire news appear to give up on one of the
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important roles they play in news dissemination, which is challenging the overly optimistic
tone of company news and by that making it more informative for investors.
2.4.1 Other news characteristics affecting asymmetric information
The purpose of this section is to investigate what other characteristics matter for how
news influences asymmetric information. The question is essentially about identifying more
informative news through factors other than newsday turnover. Thus, a particular news
characteristic should first of all significantly affect news-return reversal relationship (to be
able to say it has an impact on the resolution of asymmetric information), and ideally also
decrease the triple news-return-turnover interaction (so that it partly takes over the role of
turnover in identifying informative news).
The first characteristic under consideration is the number of individual news items
released during day t (count), which relates to the practice of news agencies to publish
stories in parts. Tetlock (2010) has suggested that the number of news items proxies for
the thoroughness of the story made up from them. One reason for this could be that
more parts increase the overall length of the story and longer stories have greater potential
to be informative. An alternative channel would be that having more parts usually also
means a story is spread out over a larger portion of the day and can thus include updates
on subsequent developments, compared to a story released at a single point in time. To
distinguish between these two channels and also directly test whether longer stories are
more informative, I include the total length (number of words, words) in a story as a
characteristic. In case there were several stories on a given day, I take their average length.
Finally, one could consider how much a story is focused on a particular company. This can
be approximated by counting words in the text relating to that company (e.g. by appearing
in the same sentence as the company name or ticker) and taking the ratio of these ”relevant”
words to total words (fraction). One would intuitively expect more focused news to be able
to deliver more information about the company and thus resolve more of the information
asymmetry.
Methodologically, I first demean each characteristic by day and size quintile (this is es-
pecially important for count, which is positively correlated with size) and add them to the
regression equation by interacting them with the Exret∗News variable. I take the natural
logarithm of the number of words before demeaning to reduce the large skewness of this
variable. Due to the demeaning, the coefficient on Exret∗News has the interpretation of
the effect on reversal of news with the average value on each characteristic. The coefficients
on Exret∗News∗[characteristic] on the other hand, give the effect of a unit increase in
either count, words or fraction.
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[Table 2.5 around here]
In terms of summary statistics, Panel A of Table 2.5 presents the standard deviations
(means are zero by construction) and correlations between the three characteristics. Two
effects that stand out are the virtual lack of correlation between count and words, indicating
that stories consisting of more parts are not necessarily longer, and the strong negative
correlation between words and fraction. The consequences of this negative correlation are
apparent in the regression estimates in Panel B. There, the log of the number of words
per story has the expected positive sign, meaning that longer stories do indeed convey
more information. On the other hand, the fraction of words related to the company is
significantly negative. When both are included in the regression, only the former remains
significant, so lower fraction is just proxying for greater story length. Increasing the number
of individual news items also does have the predicted effect of reducing reversal but the effect
is concentrated at the low end of the range. Beyond a certain threshold, additional news
items do not seem to have an additional impact. Finally, including all three variables in
the regression shows that the number of news items and the number of words are in fact
distinct channels increasing (for count up to a certain point) the informativeness of news
stories. This hints at the ”spreading out” effect of count though it would be interesting to
provide direct evidence of this interpretation. It should also be noted that the news-return-
turnover interaction remains significant in all regressions, also in the full specification in the
rightmost column, so the list of important news characteristics, to which the market reacts,
extends beyond the ones discussed here.
2.4.2 Relation of other news characteristics to news tone and news source
An additional question concerns the way in which other news characteristics might be
connected to news tone and news source examined earlier. In particular, can they be help-
ful in explaining why only news days with both wire and agency news contribute to the
resolution of asymmetric information and only if the resulting combination is not positive?
Comparing the left and right half of Table 2.6, it is indeed the case that the count of indi-
vidual news items is higher on days with news from both companies and agencies, than on
days with only one type of news, an effect which is expected to arise almost mechanically.
However, the average length of a news story is also greater on days with both types of news,
which is less obvious and suggestive of longer wire news being more important, if they are
more likely to be picked up by news agencies. In terms of news source and the fraction of
words related to the company, there are two pattern to be seen. On one hand, agency news
released on its own is less related to a particular company than agency news released on the
same day as wire news. This is intuitive evidence of the fact that when news agencies release
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on a day with wire news, they are indeed inspired by the content of the company announce-
ment. The other pattern is more intriguing. Although agency news generally has a lower or
very similar fraction compared to wire news, there is one notable exception - for negative
news days featuring both types of news, the agency news has a significantly higher fraction
of words related to the company. This is mostly due to the fact that the fraction of related
words for corresponding wire news is unusually low - just 55% of words are deemed relevant.
[Table 2.6 around here]
The fact that negative wire news generally has a lower fraction of words related to the
announcing company (it is also true of wire news released on its own) brings the attribution
bias to mind. This bias is very well-known in psychology and has also found extensive appli-
cation to finance, see Gervais and Odean (2001) or Coval and Shumway (2005) for empirical
evidence and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) for a theoretical representa-
tion. It basically describes the human tendency to ascribe successes to own actions (internal
factors) and explain failures through adverse circumstances (external or situational factors).
Translated onto financial news, this would manifest itself in very prominent portrayal of the
company in positive news and playing down its role in negative news while concentrating
on e.g. the general market environment, something that Clatworthy and Jones (2006) have
documented for CEO letters to shareholders. Of course, at the level of the company it might
well be a deliberate PR strategy rather than an unconscious bias but the underlying mecha-
nism is the same. The desire of companies to ”explain” their negative news through outside
effects is also apparent in negative wire news being substantially longer than positive.
Agency news in this context seems to play a useful role in the sense of staying focused
on the company itself, a likely consequence of the fact that agency news is generally much
shorter than wire news and especially so if both are issued on the same day. This also
seems to explain why in the case of an overall negative or neutral combination of wire and
agency news, the latter was much more negative in tone (see bottom panel of Table 2.4). The
mechanism behind what was called ”toning down” appears to be in fact ”shortening down”.
For negative news this also apparently has the effect of making the negative message more
direct - by eliminating the layer aimed at explaining bad company news through external
factors - and thus more informative. The fact that news agencies do not make positive
wire news more informative is also consistent with this mechanism. There, the underlying
company-related content is anyway positive (and also much more concise), so a summarized
version of the company announcement supplied by the news agencies does not add much to
the overall news informativeness.
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2.5 Conclusions
To answer the question of which news resolves asymmetric information, more than 1mln
company-specific news stories were analyzed over the period 2003-2011. Departing from the
empirical hypotheses provided by the stylized model of Tetlock (2010), the study focuses on
two dimensions of public news: its source and its tone. On any given news day, the source
of the news can be either the companies themselves, news agencies such as Reuters, or
both. Tone differentiates news based on whether from a linguistic point of view it conveys
positive, negative or neutral content.
Three empirical effects should be observed if news resolves asymmetric information:
short-term return reversal should be smaller after news days compared to no-news days,
news days accompanied by high turnover should reduce reversal even more and, the corre-
lation between absolute return and turnover should be higher on news days. Together they
are representative of a market in which signals about future payoffs are initially held only
by a privileged group of informed investors, who however suffer from a liquidity shock, and
are subsequently revealed through public news. The remaining investors, having seen the
news, are also able to infer the size and direction of informed traders’ liquidity shock and
are more willing to accommodate it, generating the patterns described above. One can see
that the critical parameter in this setup is the informativeness of public news.
I find that all three effects apply to news issued over my sample period. Importantly,
they do not disappear during the financial crisis, underscoring the continuous importance
of public news to financial markets. Additionally, the effects are not limited to earnings
announcements, which are clearly informative and have been comprehensively studied in
the literature, but extend to other news as well.
Differentiating news by its source reveals that neither direct wire news from the compa-
nies, nor agency news from the likes of Reuters contributes to resolving asymmetric infor-
mation when issued in isolation. Only news days featuring a combination of news from both
sources are associated with subsequent reversals, which are significantly lower on average.
Thus, it seems that news agencies are effective in selecting the most interesting corporate
news to report on, which is arguably one of the most important reasons for their existence.
They are, however, apparently less successful in generating interesting news of their own
accord. In particular, analyzing absolute return-turnover correlations around pure agency
news reveals that the spike predicted by theory occurs one day before the news and already
begins to decrease, albeit slowly, on the day the news released, suggesting the market reacts
ahead of such stories.
A related finding is that the average piece of positive news also does not resolve asym-
metric information. Intuitively, this could be interrelated with the insignificance of wire
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news, because such news tends to be positively biased for rather well-known reasons. As
it happens, these are two distinct effects as evidenced by the fact that wire news remains
insignificant even if negative and conversely, positive news remains insignificant even when
it comes from both sources on the same day. By contrast, reversals after negative and neu-
tral news days with stories from both sources are significantly smaller. A closer look at this
phenomenon points to the second important role news agencies play in financial markets.
Besides selecting important corporate announcements to report on, they also ”tone down”
those announcements, which is evident from the fact that a typical agency story has a more
negative tone than a wire story issued about the same company on the same day. This
content filtering apparently increases the informativeness of news for investors and it is
therefore remarkable that it does not work for clearly positive wire stories. The explanation
offered in this paper relates to the popular attribution bias, or a deliberate application of it
by companies having to announce negative news. Such news tends to be much longer and
less related to the company compared to positive, indicating that external circumstances
are being called upon by companies in order to ”explain” the negative news and make the
company itself look less bad. Agency news by contrast are much shorter and stay focused
on the company itself, thus making the negative message more direct. Such shortening
however, cannot work when the original content of wire news is already positive, consistent
with the empirical findings. This mechanism could work parallel to or reinforce the effects
of spin documented elsewhere in the literature. Taken together, this lack of filtering of
positive wire stories seems to explain, why adding agency coverage does not make them
more informative.
An additional finding relates to the role of turnover as a proxy for news informativeness.
In short, high turnover significantly increases the impact of news categories, which are
insignificant on average, such as positive or wire news. This suggests that at least some
news stories in these categories are indeed informative and it is a compelling direction for
future research to search for more direct measures of news informativeness, besides tone
and source. Three such characteristics, the count of individual news items, the number of
words in the story and the fraction of words relating to the company have been tested and
the first two found to be significant. However, none of them nor their combination drives
out the turnover effect, suggesting the list of important news characteristics is longer and
inviting further research.
Finally, the model in the form laid out in Tetlock (2010) makes several assumptions
about how investors interact with news. First of all, it assumes that investors take notice
whenever a piece of public news arrives. Given the ever increasing news volume and evidence
of limited or selective attention, this does not need to be true. Furthermore, it assumes
that once investors have read the news they fully to understand it and optimally retrieve
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the signal it conveys about future payoffs. Whether they are indeed able to do that in the
complex world of financial markets is also open to question. Relaxing either assumption
would also be interesting for further research.
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Figure 2.1: US share of global newsflow
(a) Distinct stocks
(b) News items
The columns in Panel (a) represent the number (on the left axis) of distinct stocks linked
to wire (red columns) and agency news (blue columns). The full column gives the global
number, while the solid part represents the US. The red and blue lines give the US share
(right axis) of global stocks linked to wire and agency news respectively. Panel (b) performs
the same analysis for individual news items.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of news items by type
(a) Wire news
(b) Agency news
The plots show the total number (right axis) as well as the average number of words and
sentences (left axis) for all individual news items, news item grouped by the four distinct
categories as well as per story basis. Stories are identified as all news items sharing a
common PNAC (Primary News Access Code) identifier. Because PNACs can be reassigned
after a certain time, a news item has to appear within 14 days since the last item with the
same PNAC to be treated as part of the same story. The statistics are computed for agency
and wire news separately.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of stories by tone
(a) Wire news
(b) Agency news
The plots show the total number of stories broken down according to their tone. The three
tone categories are ’negative’, ’positive’ and ’neutral’, with the latter meaning neither a
negative nor a positive assignment could be made. The assignments are determined by a
language processing algorithm, which scans the text and searches for similarities to stories
evaluated by humans. The numbers are computed for agency and wire news separately.
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Figure 2.4: Matching RICs to PERMNOs
(a) Wire news
(b) Agency news
The plots show the effectiveness of matching individual stocks (left axis) and the corre-
sponding news volumes (on a per story basis, right axis)) from the Thomson Reuters News
Analytics database to CRSP. For each column, the solid part represents the fraction of
stocks or stories that could be matched in a given year. The numbers are computed for
agency and wire news separately.
54
Figure 2.5: The impact of news on the correlation between absolute returns and turnover
Figure 2.5 shows daily cross-sectional correlation between abnormal return and turnover
plotted in event time. An event is defined as either a news day or a no-news day. Each
daily correlation is computed using all observations from all stocks, which are either on the
event day or the respective number of days away from it.
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Figure 2.6: Positive and negative tone breakpoints over time
Plotted above is the time series of the breakpoints used each quarter to differentiate between
positive, neutral and negative news days. Positive news days are defined as falling into the
top 25% of the previous quarter distribution of weighted average tone (above the green
line) and negative ones as falling into the bottom 25% (below the red line). News days in
between the two lines are classified as neutral.
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Table 2.1: Baseline results on news and reversals
The Table presents results of estimating Equation 2 in the full sample and two subsamples divided by the beginning of the
financial crisis. The estimates are obtained from a single panel regression using all eligible observations and including month
fixed effects. The dependent variable is stock’s i excess return over days [t+ 2 : t+ 10], which is regressed day t excess return
Exret, the news indicator News, abnormal turnover Abturn and two-way and three-way interactions between these variables.
Furthermore the regression includes standard control variables such as Size, book-to-market ratio BtM , past returns Mom and
past volatility Pastvol as well as the interaction between size and excess return. To assess the role of earnings announcements
in driving the overall results, in the three columns in the right the news dummy is replaced with two dummies for earnings
and non-earnings news respectively. t-statistics appearing below the coefficients are computed from standard errors clustered
on firm and day.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
All news Earnings and non-earnings news
Variable 2003 - 2011 2003 - 2007 2008 - 2011 2003 - 2011 2003 - 2007 2008 - 2011
Intercept 0.0025 -0.0090 ** 0.0012 0.0025 -0.0089 ** 0.0013
( 1.37 ) ( -2.81 ) ( 0.54 ) ( 1.39 ) ( -2.80 ) ( 0.56 )
Exret -0.0417 ** -0.0485 ** -0.0360 * -0.0417 ** -0.0482 ** -0.0362 *
( -3.86 ) ( -4.96 ) ( -2.02 ) ( -3.85 ) ( -4.92 ) ( -2.03 )
Exret ∗News 0.0276 ** 0.0391 ** 0.0193
( 3.82 ) ( 4.56 ) ( 1.74 )
Exret ∗ Earn 0.0662 ** 0.0566 ** 0.0748 **
( 4.15 ) ( 3.23 ) ( 3.04 )
Exret ∗Nonearn 0.0202 ** 0.0328 ** 0.0112
( 2.78 ) ( 3.71 ) ( 1.02 )
Exret ∗Abturn -0.0039 0.0036 -0.0136 -0.0044 0.0026 -0.0132
( -0.72 ) ( 0.68 ) ( -1.44 ) ( -0.81 ) ( 0.48 ) ( -1.39 )
Exret ∗News ∗Abturn 0.0103 * 0.0045 0.0173 *
( 2.06 ) ( 0.75 ) ( 2.05 )
Exret ∗ Earn ∗Abturn 0.0072 0.0109 0.0053
( 0.84 ) ( 1.09 ) ( 0.38 )
Exret ∗Nonearn ∗Abturn 0.0108 * 0.0050 0.0173 *
( 2.13 ) ( 0.81 ) ( 2.04 )
Exret ∗ Size -0.0040 -0.0031 -0.0046 -0.0035 -0.0026 -0.0041
( -1.55 ) ( -1.28 ) ( -1.11 ) ( -1.39 ) ( -1.10 ) ( -1.01 )
News -0.0003 ** 0.0000 -0.0007 **
( -2.45 ) ( 0.17 ) ( -3.68 )
Earn -0.0013 ** -0.0007 -0.0021 **
( -3.04 ) ( -1.43 ) ( -2.75 )
Nonearn -0.0003 * 0.0001 -0.0007 **
( -2.05 ) ( 0.36 ) ( -3.33 )
News ∗Abturn -0.0006 ** -0.0012 ** 0.0004
( -3.17 ) ( -5.54 ) ( 1.23 )
Earn ∗Abturn -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0008
( -0.14 ) ( -1.40 ) ( 1.09 )
Nonearn ∗Abturn -0.0006 ** -0.0012 ** 0.0004
( -3.18 ) ( -5.69 ) ( 1.32 )
Abturn 0.0017 ** 0.0020 ** 0.0011 ** 0.0017 ** 0.0020 ** 0.0011 **
( 11.15 ) ( 11.85 ) ( 3.82 ) ( 11.19 ) ( 11.90 ) ( 3.84 )
Size -0.0001 -0.0002 ** 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 ** 0.0001
( -1.05 ) ( -2.83 ) ( 1.00 ) ( -1.11 ) ( -2.87 ) ( 0.96 )
BtM 0.0009 ** 0.0012 ** 0.0008 ** 0.0009 ** 0.0012 ** 0.0008 **
( 5.42 ) ( 6.34 ) ( 3.49 ) ( 5.41 ) ( 6.33 ) ( 3.48 )
Mom 0.0000 0.0006 * -0.0007 ** 0.0000 0.0006 * -0.0007 **
( -0.04 ) ( 2.28 ) ( -2.66 ) ( -0.04 ) ( 2.28 ) ( -2.66 )
Pastvol -0.0196 -0.0214 -0.0230 -0.0197 -0.0214 -0.0232
( -1.06 ) ( -1.21 ) ( -0.78 ) ( -1.06 ) ( -1.21 ) ( -0.78 )
Number Of Observations 5’456’013 3’159’467 2’296’546 5’456’013 3’159’467 2’296’546
R-Squared 0.0198 0.0184 0.0212 0.0198 0.0184 0.0213
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Table 2.2: Summary of company characteristics
For the purposes of this Table all company characteristics are measured quarterly (at the end of every June for BtM) and their
definitions are as follows:
• Size, is the average market capitalization
• BtM, Book-to-Market, is the ratio of book equity reported for year t to market capitalization at the end of year t
• PastRet, is the cumulative raw return over the previous 12 months, skipping the most recent month
• AnCov, analyst coverage, is the number of analysts issuing forecasts before the most recent earnings announcement
• AnDisp, analyst dispersion, is the standard deviation of all forecasts before the most recent earnings announcement
around the mean forecast
• InstOwn, institutional ownership, is the fraction of institutional shareholders
• Illiq, is the Amihud illiquidity ratio, computed as the average daily ratio of absolute return to dollar trading volume
multiplied by 106
Means, standard deviations and correlations between all characteristics are reported in upper half of the Table. The lower half
presents the breakdown of newsflow for companies sorted on past return (by news tone) and size (by news source).
Size BtM PastRet AnCov AnDisp InstOwn Illiq
mean 6.83 0.63 0.23 6.31 0.04 0.64 0.05
std. dev. 1.64 0.60 0.85 5.59 0.17 0.28 0.20
Size 1 -0.181 -0.030 0.572 0.022 0.383 -0.345
BtM 1 0.171 -0.089 0.078 -0.079 0.118
PastRet 1 -0.055 -0.020 -0.150 -0.003
AnCov 1 0.029 0.255 -0.148
AnDisp 1 0.028 -0.003
InstOwn 1 -0.294
Illiq 1
share of all
news days by past return tercile
low medium high
negative 0.237 0.254 0.259
neutral 0.498 0.522 0.525
positive 0.265 0.223 0.217
by size tercile
small medium big
agency 0.098 0.167 0.358
wire 0.670 0.607 0.365
both 0.232 0.226 0.277
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Table 2.3: News and reversals in subsamples
This Table contains the results of the baseline regression for stocks grouped according to various characteristics. All rankings
(except book-to-market) are updated quarterly and tercile breakpoints are used. Subsamples are generated by interacting all
variables with a set of three dummy variables representing rank assignments, so that only one regression has to be estimated
per ranking. The dependent variable is stock’s i excess return over days [t+ 2 : t+ 10], which is regressed day t excess return
Exret, the news indicator News, abnormal turnover Abturn and two-way and three-way interactions between these variables.
Furthermore the regression includes standard control variables such as Size, book-to-market ratio BtM , past returns Mom and
past volatility Pastvol as well as the interaction between size and excess return. t-statistics appearing below the coefficients
are computed from standard errors clustered on firm and day.
Significance levels: -ˆ 10%, * - 5%, ** - 1%
low medium medium high-low
Panel A: size
exret -0.072 ** ( -6.00 ) -0.046 ** ( -4.73 ) -0.024 ( -1.27 ) 0.048
exret*news 0.072 ** ( 4.78 ) 0.028 ** ( 2.74 ) 0.014 ( 1.32 ) -0.058
exret*abturn -0.004 ( -0.84 ) -0.013 ˆ ( -1.74 ) -0.001 ( -0.05 ) 0.003
exret*news*abturn 0.010 ( 1.29 ) 0.021 ** ( 2.65 ) -0.001 ( -0.07 ) -0.011
Panel B: book-to-market
exret -0.049 ** ( -4.87 ) -0.040 ** ( -3.46 ) -0.037 ** ( -2.76 ) 0.011
exret*news 0.025 ** ( 2.81 ) 0.022 * ( 2.17 ) 0.027 * ( 2.22 ) 0.001
exret*abturn -0.006 ( -0.91 ) -0.014 ( -1.91 ) -0.002 ( -0.23 ) 0.004
exret*news*abturn 0.014 * ( 2.06 ) 0.021 ** ( 2.86 ) 0.011 ( 1.31 ) -0.003
Panel C: past return
exret -0.036 ** ( -2.99 ) -0.051 ** ( -4.66 ) -0.046 ** ( -3.87 ) -0.011
exret*news 0.023 ** ( 2.05 ) 0.043 ** ( 4.40 ) 0.012 ( 1.23 ) -0.011
exret*abturn -0.011 ( -1.45 ) -0.009 ( -1.37 ) -0.003 ( -0.40 ) 0.008
exret*news*abturn 0.015 ˆ ( 1.86 ) 0.012 ( 1.61 ) 0.019 ** ( 2.56 ) 0.004
Panel D: analyst coverage
exret -0.037 ** ( -3.42 ) -0.041 ** ( -3.38 ) -0.045 ** ( -3.48 ) -0.009
exret*news 0.023 * ( 2.13 ) 0.033 ** ( 3.09 ) 0.026 ** ( 2.66 ) 0.003
exret*abturn -0.008 ( -1.48 ) -0.010 ( -1.25 ) 0.000 ( -0.01 ) 0.008
exret*news*abturn 0.019 ** ( 2.82 ) 0.017 * ( 2.04 ) 0.003 ( 0.36 ) -0.015
Panel E: analyst dispersion
exret -0.052 ** ( -5.35 ) -0.031 * ( -2.52 ) -0.033 * ( -2.02 ) 0.019
exret*news 0.032 ** ( 3.19 ) 0.009 ( 0.90 ) 0.022 ˆ ( 1.74 ) -0.010
exret*abturn -0.008 ( -1.14 ) -0.019 ( -1.87 ) 0.005 ( 0.40 ) 0.013
exret*news*abturn 0.016 * ( 2.29 ) 0.023 * ( 2.29 ) 0.000 ( 0.02 ) -0.016
Panel F: institutional ownership
exret -0.035 ** ( -2.65 ) -0.040 ** ( -3.59 ) -0.046 ** ( -4.00 ) -0.011
exret*news 0.021 ( 1.43 ) 0.034 ** ( 3.32 ) 0.021 ** ( 2.41 ) 0.001
exret*abturn -0.015 ** ( -2.04 ) -0.002 ( -0.35 ) -0.004 ( -0.47 ) 0.011
exret*news*abturn 0.018 ˆ ( 1.88 ) 0.015 * ( 1.97 ) 0.012 ( 1.55 ) -0.006
Panel G: illiquidity
exret -0.044 ** ( -4.16 ) -0.035 ** ( -2.92 ) -0.033 * ( -2.01 ) 0.011
exret*news 0.029 ** ( 2.78 ) 0.017 ( 1.64 ) 0.026 ˆ ( 1.83 ) -0.003
exret*abturn 0.016 ** ( 2.23 ) -0.019 ** ( -2.60 ) -0.035 ** ( -3.76 ) -0.051
exret*news*abturn -0.008 ( -0.96 ) 0.025 ** ( 3.32 ) 0.012 ( 0.97 ) 0.019
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Table 2.4: Return reversals - the role of news tone and source
In this Table the key coefficients from Equation 2 are compared for news categories formed on news source and tone. News
can be either direct ’wire’ news released by companies or ’agency’ news provided by outlets such as Reuters. Consequently, any
given news day can contain only ’wire’ or ’agency’ news, or both. The tone of a news day can be either positive, negative or
neutral based on the average tone of individual stories on that day falling into upper, lower or the two middle quartiles of the
distribution of tone from the previous quarter. In Panel C, the one of ’wire’ and ’agency’ stories is compared conditional on
whether they occur on the same day or on separate days. The estimates in Panels A and B are obtained from a single panel
regression using all eligible observations and including month fixed effects. The dependent variable is stock’s i excess return
over days [t+2 : t+10], which is regressed day t excess return Exret, the news indicator News, abnormal turnover Abturn and
two-way and three-way interactions between these variables. Furthermore the regression includes standard control variables
such as Size, book-to-market ratio BtM , past returns Mom and past volatility Pastvol as well as the interaction between size
and excess return. t-statistics appearing below the coefficients are computed from standard errors clustered on firm and day.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
Panel A: univariate sorts on tone and source
news tone news source
positive neutral negative wire agency both
Exret ∗News -0.0041 0.0285 ** 0.0427 ** 0.0106 0.0130 0.0507 **
( -0.36 ) ( 3.06 ) ( 3.55 ) ( 1.14 ) ( 0.90 ) ( 4.69 )
Exret ∗News 0.0287 ** 0.0085 0.0040 0.0275 ** 0.0183 * -0.0003
∗Abturn ( 3.41 ) ( 1.53 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 3.49 ) ( 1.98 ) ( -0.05 )
Panel B: sorting on tone and source
positive neutral negative
wire agency both wire agency both wire agency both
Exret ∗News -0.0042 -0.0107 -0.0024 0.0213 0.0143 0.0389 ** 0.0172 0.0143 0.0829 **
( -0.30 ) ( -0.45 ) ( -0.10 ) ( 1.64 ) ( 0.71 ) ( 3.12 ) ( 0.79 ) ( 0.66 ) ( 4.92 )
Exret ∗News 0.0364 ** 0.0355 * 0.0206 0.0120 0.0220 0.0034 0.0394 ** 0.0042 -0.0137
∗Abturn ( 2.63 ) ( 2.11 ) ( 1.65 ) ( 1.10 ) ( 1.74 ) ( 0.56 ) ( 2.61 ) ( 0.32 ) ( -1.56 )
Panel C: average weighted tone of wire and agency news stories
when issued alone when issued on the same day
overall news day tone wire agency diff. wire agency diff.
negative -0.56 -0.58 -0.02 -0.21 -0.42 -0.21
neutral 0.26 0.22 -0.03 0.37 0.11 -0.25
positive 0.78 0.76 -0.02 0.73 0.70 -0.03
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Table 2.5: News characteristics and asymmetric information
This Table documents the importance of various news characteristic for the resolution of asymmetric information. In particular,
the count of individual news items per news day (count), the average number of words per news item (words) and the fraction
of words identified as related to the company mentioned in the announcement (fraction) are examined. Each characteristic
is demeaned by day and size quintile and ”count” and ”words” are also in logarithms to reduce skewness. The rest of the
regression equation is as in Eq. 2.2. The coefficient on ”exret*news” measures the effect on reversal of news with the average
value on each characteristic. t-statistics appearing below the coefficients are computed from standard errors clustered on firm
and day.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
.5 Panel A: summary statistics
std. dev. correlations
count 5.73 1 - 0.069 -0.118
count (if ≤ 5) 1.68 1 -0.0508 -0.075
words 0.78 1 -0.419
fraction 0.29 1
Panel B: impact on the resolution of asymmetric information
all days count ≤ 5 all days all days all days count ≤ 5
exret -0.0412 ** -0.0392 ** -0.0417 ** -0.0417 ** -0.0418 ** -0.0391 **
( -3.79 ) ( -3.57 ) ( -3.86 ( -3.86 ) ( -3.86 ) ( -3.56 )
exret*news 0.0272 ** 0.0313 ** 0.0271 ** 0.0260 ** 0.0343 ** 0.0333 **
( 3.75 ) ( 3.19 ) ( 3.75 ( 3.60 ) ( 2.80 ) ( 3.41 )
exret*count -0.0007 0.0096 ** 0.0098 **
( -1.53 ) ( 2.74 ) ( 2.75 )
exret*words 0.0144 ** 0.0126 ** 0.0129 *
( 3.64 ( 2.63 ) ( 1.96 )
exret*fraction -0.0467 ** -0.0119 -0.0096
( -3.90 ) ( -0.81 ) ( -0.50 )
exret*abturn -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0031
( -0.69 ) ( -0.59 ) ( -0.72 ( -0.71 ) ( -0.72 ) ( -0.59 )
exret*news*abturn 0.0126 ** 0.0163 ** 0.0100 * 0.0097 * 0.0099 * 0.0153 **
( 2.39 ) ( 2.60 ) ( 2.02 ( 1.94 ) ( 2.00 ) ( 2.45 )
Number of Observations 5’456’013 5’272’867 5’456’013 5’456’013 5’456’013 5’272’867
R-square 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.021
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Table 2.6: Summary of other news characteristics by news tone and news source
To gauge the strength of the association between news tone, news source and other news characteristics, this Table
presents average values of the count of individual news items per news day (count), the average number of words per
news item (words) and the fraction of words identified as related to the company mentioned in the announcement
(fraction). The averages are computed separately for positive, neutral and negative news days and also for wire and
agency news. With respect to news source (wire or agency) there is also a possibility that the two types are released
on the same day and this is reflected on the right hand side of the Table.
average value
when issued alone when issued on the same day
variable = count wire agency diff. wire agency diff.
negative 1.12 2.06 0.94 1.31 3.00 1.70
neutral 1.18 1.99 0.81 1.56 2.78 1.22
positive 1.18 1.33 0.15 1.36 1.49 0.13
variable = words
negative 914 496 -418 1’668 275 -1’393
neutral 595 345 -250 1’295 267 -1’028
positive 759 439 -320 923 234 -689
variable = fraction
negative 0.67 0.46 -0.21 0.55 0.67 0.13
neutral 0.70 0.57 -0.14 0.60 0.66 0.06
positive 0.74 0.51 -0.23 0.70 0.73 0.03
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Research paper 3
Short-term reactions to news
announcements: what do investors
learn from them?
Michal Dzielinski
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Abstract
This paper extends models of learning about profitability to the case of voluntary disclo-
sure. Using short-window regressions, I first find that the whole company-specific news flow,
not just earnings announcements, has the property of providing useful information about
other stocks. Consequently, betas of announcing stocks increase significantly in months
with some news, especially if the volume of news is unusually high. However, I also find
that voluntary disclosure differs from earnings announcements in one important respect.
While for the latter the sign of the news is not important, it is only negative non-earnings
news that has a significant impact on beta. This is consistent with theoretical predictions
concerning incentives of managers to withhold negative news, which subsequently leads to
disclosure ”bunching”.
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3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I study ten years of news released by and about companies listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, a dataset of almost 1.5mln announcements. In the first
step, I examine whether relating daily returns to news generates the kind of cross-sectional
patterns that would be expected based on stock characteristics, such as size and visibility,
and news characteristics, such as informational content and contribution to the resolution of
uncertainty. Then, I study whether the effect of news persists at monthly time horizons and
affects the returns of the announcing stock and other stock in the market in a systematic
way. With respect to the announcing stock, the analysis is focused on the impact of news
on alpha, that is the systematic outperformance of the market. The impact on other stocks
is analyzed following a recent contribution by Patton and Verardo (2012), who propose and
test a model in which learning about profitability of other companies causes the beta of the
company announcing its earnings to increase on the announcement day. The overarching
question is whether public financial news enables investors to learn not only about the
announcing stock but about other stocks as well.
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, the learning effect of news extends
to the monthly horizon and to the general news flow, not just earnings announcements.
This is based on the fact that betas increase significantly in months with news and the
increase is driven by months with above average news flow, measured as the number of
days in a month on which news about a given company was released. Both are non-trivial
extensions, since on one hand the results of Patton and Verardo (2012) and in the first part
of this paper seem to suggest that markets are very efficient at incorporating individual
news announcements. However, the effects of multiple announcements over time add up to
a significant effect at lower frequencies. On the other hand, earnings are a very special type
of announcements and it is not at all clear that their impact should generalize to other types
of news as well. Empirically, there is one important difference in that for the general news
flow investors appear to learn more from bad news than good news. This is an interesting
contribution to the ”learning from news” literature, which also includes Savor and Wilson
(2011), and which has claimed that for earnings announcements the effect is symmetric.
The critical difference between earnings and other news seems to be that while earnings
announcements are pre-scheduled and mandatory, companies have considerable freedom
in choosing which other news to release and when. Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009)
and Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer (2011) give theoretical motivation for the incentive of
managers to withhold bad news and disclose it in clusters, that is at a time when other
companies are also disclosing similar bad news. For the above reasons, bad news about one
company can be seen as more indicative of the news that other companies might also disclose
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in the near future than good news, which all companies are happy to disclose immediately.
Hence, there is significant increase in beta in months with bad news but no similar increase
in months with good news. However, that does not mean that good news has no systematic
impact on stock prices, just that its effect seems limited to the announcing stocks. This is
because alphas in months in which stocks announce positive news are significantly higher
than in other months. Thus, the second main result of the paper is to show that different
incentives governing the release of good and bad news make the latter more useful for
learning about the prospects of other stocks.
The separate analysis of good and bad news was made possible by applying automatic
text-processing algorithms to all relevant announcements made over the period from January
2003 till December 2011. Through the use of such processing and by showing the asymmetry
in how good and bad news impacts medium-term returns, the paper also contributes to the
growing literature on the role of public news in financial markets. Starting with Chan (2003)
there has been an interest in how certain properties of stock returns, drift and reversal in his
case, depend on the release of company news. Later papers have tended to focus on shorter
like (bi-)weekly (Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy
(2008), Tetlock (2010)), daily (Tetlock (2010)) or even intraday horizons. One notable
exception is the study of Sinha (2010) on news and momentum, which also uses the same
dataset as this paper. To my best knowledge, this is the first study to use content analysis
to separate the alpha and beta channels through which good and bad news are incorporated
into stock prices and what effect this has on cross-company learning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes case for using textual
analysis news by showing that good / bad news differentiated this way represent signifi-
cantly positive / negative innovations in the price process. Section 3 discusses how these
innovations translate into a systematic effect on stock returns. Section 4 discusses the
methodology to empirically verify the implications of the theoretical discussion. Section 5
presents the results, followed by robustness checks in Section 6. The final section concludes.
3.2 Short-term reactions to news announcements
To determine when there was news about companies listed on the NYSE, I use the
information provided in the Thomson Reuters News Analytics database. It contains the
complete archive of company-specific news announcements published by Reuters on any of
its financial services since January 2003. The database also covers announcements made by
companies directly to investors via channels like the PR Newswire and BusinessWire. At the
end of 2011 it contained around 13mln announcements for 20’000 stocks worldwide. NYSE
stocks were responsible for ∼ 12% of the news flow, the highest share for any exchange in
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the world, commensurate with their large weight in global market capitalization. Table 3.1
reports the number of news and news days for all stocks as well as for quintiles sorted on
relevant stock characteristics. Given that there are 2’919’421 daily observations in the sam-
ple, there is roughly one news day for each five trading days on average but his proportion
varies significantly along the size dimension. Size is defined as the logarithm of market cap
(price times shares outstanding) computed at the end of June each year. The largest stocks
dominate the news flow with ∼ 60% of all news announcements being released in the top
quintile. For this reason, the other subsample sorts are performed on a size-adjusted basis.
The procedure for size adjustment follows Tetlock (2010) that is all stocks are first sorted
on size and then, within each size group, on e.g. analyst coverage. Finally, stocks with
the least analysts from each size quintile form the lowest analyst coverage quintile and so
on. Analyst coverage is defined as the number of analysts issuing a forecast before each
quarterly earnings announcement. More analysts coverage generates more news indepen-
dently of size, which seems intuitive, but interestingly so does analyst dispersion. This is
defined as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings forecast. It appears related to the
’differences of opinion’ interpretation of analyst dispersion suggested by Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina (2002). If investors hold diverse opinions about a stock, they are more likely
to express them than if they agree, in which case they would just reiterate the opinions
of others. Finally, the last panel of Table 3.1 provides tentative evidence that public news
is associated with information arrivals, because news days tend to cluster in periods of
high abnormal turnover, which has been used to proxy for information entering the market
in numerous earlier studies (Kim and Verrecchia (1991), Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin
(2001), Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002)). Daily abnormal turnover is calculated
as the log of daily turnover (shares volume divided by shares outstanding), de-trended using
the 60-day average of log turnover1. Then, the daily observations are averaged across the
month to arrive at the final proxy used to construct the ranking.
The major benefit of using news data from Thomson Reuters is that the texts of the
announcements have been processed by a linguistic algorithm and evaluated for positive
and negative tone. The objective of the procedure is the same as in the related literature
analyzing the role of public news in financial markets - to quantify language and develop
a numerical measure summarizing the content of text, where the fact whether the text
was positive or negative tends to be the most important dimension. Tetlock (2007) and ?
have popularized the fraction of negative words, as defined in Harvard-IV4 sociolinguistic
dictionary, as one such measure, which was also used by e.g. Engelberg (2008) and Graf
1To avoid the problem of zero daily turnover, I add a small constant to each daily value before taking
logarithms. The magnitude of this constant, 0.00000255, is chosen as to make the distribution of turnover
closer to normal, see Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) and Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson
(1986)
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(2011). This approach was refined by Loughran and McDonald (2011) who argue that
certain words like ’liability’ can have a different tone in financial context than in the general
language and proposed an alternative dictionary more suitable for finance. Davis, Piger,
and Sedor (2006) and Demers and Vega (2011) use software called DICTION, which also
uses word lists to look for features like optimism and certainty. Finally, Jegadeesh and
Wu (2011) develop a methodology based on the price impact of certain words in the past.
TS The measure provided by Thomson Reuters is based on the probability of the news
being positive, negative or neutral with respect to a certain company. Depending on which
probability is the highest, the whole news item is categorized as positive (+1), negative (-1)
or neutral (0) for that company. The probability is assessed by comparing the text to a
”learning set” of Reuters news, which has been scored by Reuters reporters. As such, it
is a supervised learning approach, very popular in natural language processing2. Its main
advantages are specificity to finance (because the algorithm was trained on financial news)
and the capability to analyze tone with respect to individual companies thanks to the use of
techniques such as parts-of-speech tagging (to understand which words are nouns, verbs etc.)
and named entity recognition (to understand which words refer to e.g. company names).
Details of the procedure are provided in a white paper by ThomsonReuters (2008). Earlier
studies using this data, which include Groß-Klußman and Hautsch (2011), Storkenmaier,
Wagener, and Weinhardt (2012) and Sinha (2010), have shown its usefulness both in high-
frequency and multi-day settings.
To more formally make the case that public news represents innovations in the price
process and that linguistic tone is a reasonable measure of content, I first construct a daily
measure of news tone. To this end I net positive and negative news against each other using
the following formula:
Tone =
∑
1 · probpos +
∑
(−1) · probneg
npos + nneut + nneg
∈ [−1; 1] (3.1)
In the next step, a news day is categorized as positive if the daily tone is in the highest
25% of the previous quarter’s distribution of news tone. It is negative if it belongs to the
lowest 25% and it is considered neutral if it falls in between. This procedure is similar to
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) and is intended to reflect the fact that the
benchmark for positive and negative might be changing over time. For the whole sample
this leads to a natural distribution, where half of the news days are neutral and the other
half are approximately equally split among positive and negative (see columns 3-5 in Table
3.1). In the cross section, it is interesting to note that large stocks, stocks with more analyst
coverage, but especially stocks with higher analyst dispersion tend to have more negative
2Jurafsky and Martin (2008) offer a comprehensive introduction into the theory and applications in this
field
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news.
To obtain return innovations, I use residuals (i,t) from short-window regressions from
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model:
Reti,t = αi + β1,i ·MKTt + β2,i · SMBt + β3,i ·HMLt + i,t (3.2)
where Reti,t is the return of stock i on day t and MKT, SMB and HML are daily returns
of the market, size and value factor from Kenneth French data library. The regressions
are estimated for each stock and month separately to take into account time-varying risk
exposures.
Finally, the residuals from all monthly regressions are stacked together and regressed
on three news day dummies, each of which is equal to 1 if day t had news for stock i
with the overall tone positive, negative or neutral respectively, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Since residuals from all regressions are pooled together, standard errors are clustered along
the stock dimension to control for possible autocorrelation. Given that the mean of three-
factor residuals is zero by construction, the coefficients on the news day dummies represent
deviations from this mean and the question is whether they are significantly large and
in the direction indicated by tone. The last three columns in Table 3.1 show that this
is indeed the case in the whole sample and also in all analyzed subsamples. There is
however considerable heterogeneity in the cross-section with both positive and negative
news generally being associated with larger excess returns in higher quintiles of analyst
coverage, analyst dispersion and abnormal turnover. Thus, news has more impact for stocks
with more visibility, more uncertainty and more abnormal trading, which is consistent with
public news bringing new information to the market. The fact that the significance persists
into the largest quintile of stocks, for which news days are a very common occurrence, is
further evidence of the robustness of news impact.
3.3 Systematic impact of news
The overall conclusion from the previous section is that public news represent significant
innovations in the price process and linguistic tone is a good way to capture the ex ante
content of news. In this section I turn to the question of whether news about a company is
important only for its own stock or whether it also impacts stocks of other companies. A
related question is whether the impact of news is only transitory and limited to the news
day itself or whether it is also discernible at longer time horizons.
The way to think about the second question is fairly straightforward. If news has a
systematic impact on stock returns, then this should show up as a significantly positive
(negative) constant term (alpha) during periods with positive (negative) news. In other
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words, all or most of the daily returns within a month should be shifted in the direction
indicated by the news, not just returns on the news days themselves.
Answering the first question is more involved. An appropriate framework has been sug-
gested by Patton and Verardo (2012) and is based on studying the changes in the market
beta of stocks around news announcements. The argument is that if news released about
stock i is informative for other stocks, this will increase the co-movement between stock i
and the rest of the market and an observable consequence will be an increase in its market
beta. The underlying assumption is that returns of all stocks in the market contain a com-
mon component, which makes it possible to infer information about stock j by studying
announcements related to stock i. On the other, the fact that announcements for different
companies arrive asynchronously creates the need for such cross-company learning. Empir-
ically, by computing realized betas from high-frequency returns, they find that beta indeed
spikes up on news days, an effect that is stronger for more visible stocks, stocks more corre-
lated with the economy and for news that is more informative and resolves more uncertainty
all of which support the learning hypothesis. The main limitation of their analysis is the fact
that the stock sample contains only stocks from the S&P 500 and the news sample contains
only earnings announcements, thus covering a relatively small fraction of the company and
news universe.
Extending the analysis to the general news flow is a non-trivial step, because earnings
announcements differ from voluntary disclosure in several important ways. First of all, earn-
ings have a strong quantitative component, which makes it considerably easier to determine
the content of such announcements as positive or negative and also assess the relevance
for other stocks. It is not clear that investors are able to accomplish a similar assessment
for mostly qualitative information embedded in other news releases. Furthermore, earnings
announcements are mandatory and pre-scheduled. The fact that they are mandatory means
that, aside from outright manipulation, companies have to disclose whatever information
they have at a particular time, whether good or bad. All other disclosures by contrast are
either voluntary or subject to rather general materiality requirements. Thus, it is likely
that companies will be happy to disclose all kinds of good news they have but only those
bad news for which they consider the materiality constraint to be binding, due to regula-
tory, litigation or reputational risk. Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) develop a model in
which managers accumulate bad news until it reaches a certain threshold, while good news
is released immediately. This intuition seems to hold well in reality. For a large sample of
announcements made directly by US companies through outlets such as PR Newswire or
Businesswire, Dzielinski (2012) finds the proportion of good to bad announcements to be
roughly four to one, even during the financial crisis.
The fact that managers may have incentives to withhold bad news makes the issue of
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strategic timing important for cross-sectional patterns in information disclosure. Again, it
is largely absent for earnings announcements, for which the dates are relatively inflexible
and to a large extent determined in advance with only minor deviations, but relevant for
voluntary disclosure, where the freedom of when to announce is much greater. Acharya,
DeMarzo, and Kremer (2011) show that if the arrival of information to managers cannot be
monitored, and thus they can choose when to release it, this will induce clustering in the
release of bad news but not good news.
The conclusions from this discussion cast doubt on whether one of Patton and Verardo
(2012) predictions that the sign of the news does not matter for stock beta only its ’size’
(that is the new information content it delivers to investors) should hold outside the special
case of earnings announcements. First, investors might recognize that good news is released
more eagerly and thus has a lower informational value. This is the materiality aspect
mentioned above. To see the effect of news timing, consider an investor observing two
stocks, i and j, and assume that i releases a piece of good news. Then, knowing that
companies like to release good news as soon as they have some, a rational investor would
conclude that if j also had some good news it would have disclosed it already. In other
words, the probability of j also having some good news it did not disclose yet is low, so
the informativeness of good news about i for j is limited. The situation changes however
were i to issue bad news. There, the investor has good reasons to suspect that j is also
withholding some bad news and there is much more to be learned about j by analyzing
i’s news. Empirically, this would translate into betas increasing more with bad news that
good.
3.4 Methodology
The approach to study the response of market alphas and betas to news in this paper is
based on monthly regressions using daily returns. This is in contrast to Patton and Verardo
(2012), who estimate daily betas from high-frequency returns sampled every 25 minutes.
The difference is on one hand due to the fact that it is difficult to obtain reliable high-
frequency data for the whole NYSE universe of stocks. On the other hand this approach is
appropriate, because the focus of the paper is on the importance of the broader company
newsflow rather than specific point-in-time events like earnings announcements. Monthly
betas have been commonly used to study short-term variations in risk factor sensitivities
(e.g. Pa`stor and Stambaugh (2003), Lewellen and Nagel (2006)). Ang, Hodrick, Xing,
and Zhang (2006) call it ”a natural compromise between estimating coefficients with a
reasonable degree of precision and pinning down conditional coefficients in an environment
with time-varying factor loadings”. Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect monthly betas
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to be affected by the total flow of news during the month. Moreover, this approach is
conservative in that it is biased against finding significant results. The estimation of beta
is based on the standard CAPM regression:
Reti,t = αi + βi ·MKTt + i,t (3.3)
where t ∈ T denote daily observations within month T and Reti is the return on stock i
and retM is the excess return on the market portfolio, both including dividends. Similarly
to previous literature the focus is on NYSE stocks to avoid microstructure issues typical for
NASDAQ and (usually small) AMEX stocks. I also require at least 15 daily observations
with positive trading volume for the calculation. Performing the above regression for every
stock-month in the sample yields 116’139 monthly estimates of beta for 1’420 distinct stocks.
Table 3.2 presents the averages of beta, alpha, size and monthly return for all stocks in the
sample as well as for size quintiles. Consistent with asset pricing theory, smaller stocks
earn higher returns and have higher CAPM alphas. They are however also more risky, as
evidenced by higher average betas. The beta estimates are then related to news arrivals via
the following baseline regression:
βi,T = Intercepti + δ1 ·Newsi,T + δ2 · Sizei,T + i,T (3.4)
where Newsi,T is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there was some news about stock i in
month T , according to the Thomson Reuters News Analytics database, and 0 otherwise.
Size is the monthly average of the natural logarithm of daily market capitalization (defined
as price times shares outstanding) of stock i. In other words, it is a panel regression,
which examines the average difference between betas in months with and without news,
while controlling for the effects of size, which has been shown in Table 3.2 to be a major
determinant of stock beta. Regression 3.4 uses observation pooled from all stocks, so firm
fixed effects are included to control for the considerable heterogeneity in company betas.
Note that in this setting the Size variable captures the average impact of fluctuations of
company size over time, rather than its cross-sectional variation.
An empirical problem with this type of regression design using monthly observations has
already been anticipated by Chan (2003) - that due to expanding coverage no-news months
become a rare occurrence, thus making any reasonable comparison with news months im-
possible. The last four columns of Table 3.2 provide evidence that this is indeed relevant
for my sample, which contains only ∼ 13% of no-news months and the proportion drops to
a mere 2% in the top size quintile. To overcome this issue, I split the news dummy in the
spirit of Fang and Peress (2009) into two separate dummies, News1 and News2, indicating
whether the news flow in a given month T was below or above the sample mean for stock
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i, where news flow is measured by the number of news days during the month. In this
way I can distinguish between different levels of news intensity, taking into account the fact
that the baseline intensity is very heterogenous across stocks. The conjecture is that more
intensive news flow will have a more pronounced effect on stock beta.
3.5 Empirical results
The results in Table 3.3 are consistent with the learning literature in that news events
increase the beta of a stock in a statistically and economically significant way. The economic
significance can be judged by the fact that for the average stock the news effect is comparable
in magnitude to a 16% change in size (a 0.015 increase in a news month vs. a -0.107
decrease per unit increase in the log of market capitalization). Closer examination reveals
that it is indeed months with intensive news flow driving the results with the estimate on
News2 more than twice as large as the pooled one and the estimate on News1 completely
insignificant. This suggests that months with below average news flow can be considered
no-news months, since they do not appear very informative anyway. The last column of
Table 3.3 shows that months with above average news flow still have significantly higher
betas than this combined group. The upshot is that both groups are now roughly equal in
size, improving the statistical properties3 of any comparisons, especially in subsamples.
Looking into the cross-section of stocks provides evidence consistent with the learning
explanation for the increase in betas. This argument predicts that more visible stocks and
stock more correlated with the broader economy should generate a stronger learning effect
and thus experience larger increases in beta. Proxying the correlation with the economy
by size and visibility by size-adjusted analyst coverage clearly shows that stocks from the
two top quintiles are the most affected by news. Considering a large universe of all NYSE
stocks also allows to examine just how far down the ladder does the learning effect reach.
It appears that stocks, which score medium on analyst coverage (quintile 3) still show
a pretty substantial effect. Analyst coverage also seems to be a more important factor
that market capitalization, where the effect dissipates more quickly and is only significant
at the 10% level in the middle quintile. On the other hand, it should be the case that
more informative news and news resolving greater uncertainty has more impact. Defining
informativeness for news which generally does not have a strong quantitative component
(like earnings announcements do) is challenging - the tone variable described in Section 2
does a good job at differentiating between positive and negative news but both of those can
be either important or unimportant, so a different measure is needed. The importance of
news is associated with the provision of new information to the market and this points to
3Large samples are for instance less sensitive to outliers
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average abnormal turnover during the respective month as a reasonable proxy. The amount
of uncertainty is proxied by the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, which is arguably a
measure valid not only for earnings announcements. The results along these two dimensions
line up very well with theory. The impact of news on beta increases monotonically from
the lowest quintile and reaches considerable magnitudes in the highest one.
Overall, the results so far support the alternative methodology I propose in that it
captures the impact of news on beta rather well. They also show that with respect to
the general news flow the effect that news about a company has on learning about other
companies is still visible at the monthly frequency.
3.5.1 News tone and the systematic impact of news
The main hypothesis of the paper is that due to different incentives facing managers
with respect to its release, good and bad news will have different learning value and thus
a different impact on beta. To examine this hypothesis, the News2 dummy from Eq. 3.4
is interacted with three dummy variables for good, neutral and bad news months. A good
news month is defined as having no days with bad news and some days with good news. A
bad news month is defined analogously. Months having no good or bad news days as well
as those with both types are categorized as neutral. The modified regression equation is as
follows:
βi,T = Intercepti + δ
pos
2 ·News2i,T · Posi,T + δneut2 ·News2i,T ·Neuti,T + δneg2 ·News2i,T ·Negi,T+
+ δ3 · Sizei,T + i,T
(3.5)
Therefore, it compares the betas in moths with above average news flow and the respective
tone to betas in other months. Similarly to the baseline specification, it is estimated in the
whole sample and in subsamples related to the hypothesized impact of news. The results
in Table 3.5 clearly show that the increase in beta in substantially bigger in bad months
than in good months. In fact, in good months there is no significant increase at all. The
middle category of months, which were neither clearly negative not positive behaves more
like the negative group and betas increase significantly. This further underscores the fact
that positive news is not very useful for learning across companies. The same pattern holds
in the whole sample as well as in all relevant subgroups (i.e. those for which a significant
impact of news as such could be previously established) sorted on size, analyst coverage,
abnormal turnover and analyst dispersion.
If positive news has little or no impact on beta, does that mean it has no systematic
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impact on stock returns at all? To answer this question, I turn to examine the second
output of the CAPM regression, which is the stock alpha. The analysis of stock alphas
works analogously to the analysis of betas, that is the monthly estimates are regressed on
the News2 variable, interacted with dummies for positive, negative and neutral months.
The regressions also include stock size as a control variable and firm fixed effects to allow
for heterogeneity in stock alphas. The results in Table 3.6 show a clear pattern of alphas,
which are significantly more negative (positive) in months with bad (good) news than in
other months. Neutral months are associated with average alphas undistinguishable from
other months, which is consistent with the intuition that news, which is either conflicting
(in the sense of good and bad news being released during the same month) or has no clear
direction cannot impact stock returns in a systematic fashion. However, the important
observation is that positive news about stock i does have a systematic effect on the returns
of stock i, namely it increases its alpha with respect to the market. In fact, the magnitude
of the change in alpha is larger in good months that in bad months. This relationship is
true in the whole sample as well as in most of the analyzed subsamples. It lends further
support to the hypothesis that good news is informative but its informativeness is mostly
limited to the announcing company, because other companies have no incentive to withhold
good news and so there is little potential to learn something new about them.
3.6 Robustness
In this section the sensitivity of the main findings, that beta increases in news months
particularly in bad news months, is investigated with respect to modifying the original setup
through adding more control variables to the regression and changing the way good and
bad news is categorized. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the importance of earnings
announcements for the overall results. All the results reported here are based on the News2
variable that is they compare months with above average coverage to those with either below
average or no coverage at all.
3.6.1 Additional control variables
Several aspects come into consideration when choosing the additional controls. First,
the results could potentially be due to autocorrelation in betas, thus one lag of monthly
beta is included. Otherwise, it could also be a consequence of stock volatility, because more
volatile stocks also tend to be more risky and have higher betas. Monthly stock-specific
volatility is approximated by the sum of squared residuals from the three-factor regressions
described in Section 2. For similar reasons, monthly market volatility, computed as the
sum of squared daily excess market returns, is also included. Finally, raw monthly turnover
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is added as well. The results after augmenting the regressions in equations 3.4 and 3.5
are reported in the first column of Table 3.7. The additional controls act to reduce the
initial estimates of news impact on beta but do not qualitatively change either of the main
conclusions.
3.6.2 The role of earnings announcements
In Section 3 the difference between earnings and other types of announcements was
discussed and how that might affect the predictions concerning the behavior of betas. All
the results that followed were presented for a sample, which in fact included both earnings
and non-earnings news and a perfect separation of the two is not possible at the monthly
frequency, because especially the days before and after earnings announcements tend to
be populated with other releases. However, under the assumption that the importance of
earnings announcements is big enough to influence the entire news flow around these dates,
it might still be interesting to compare months in which earnings were announced with other
months. This is shown in the second and third column of Table 3.7. The dates of earnings
announcements were taken from I/B/E/S and complemented with Compustat for stocks
without analyst coverage. Unconditionally, beta increases by more in earnings months that
in other news months. Splitting by tone also reveals that the asymmetry between good
and bad news is concentrated in the non-earnings months. For the earnings months, both
good and bad news is associated with significant increases in beta. This is the most direct
evidence that earnings and other news differs fundamentally with respect to learning across
companies.
3.6.3 Different measure of positive and negative news
The procedure to categorize news days as positive or negative based on comparing the
tone of news on day t with the distribution over the previous three months masks the fact
that in absolute terms there is much more positive than negative news. In other words, a
sizeable proportion of neutral news days would have been classified as positive based on raw
tone probabilities, without relating them to past tone. Under this alternative procedure,
all days with average tone above 0.33 are classified as positive and those where it is below
-0.33 as negative. The middle range is reserved for neutral news days as before. The
aggregation from news days to news months is also left unchanged. Still, around 25% of
news months need to be reclassified and the shift is entirely from neutral towards positive
and from negative towards neutral. As a result, the number of neutral news moths is
almost the same (though these are largely different months) but there are almost 5 times
more good months than bad. Despite this significant rotation, the results are unchanged
or even stronger, with beta increasing even more during bad months. Another apparent
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feature is that the alpha during bad months is now significantly lower, suggesting that such
exceptionally bad news is to a lesser extent accommodated through the beta channel.
3.7 Conclusions
There is mounting evidence that public news is an effective carrier of genuinely new
stock-specific information. These results are the effect of improved, automatic methods of
analyzing textual content which make it possible to ”quantify language” of hundreds of
thousands of company announcements. The question whether these individual announce-
ments combine over time to produce systematic effects on the returns of announcing stocks
or in fact also other stocks has scarcely been researched so far. In particular, this is the
first study I am aware of that combines textual analysis of a comprehensive set of company
announcements with the study of stock alpha and market beta in order to see to what ex-
tent news enters through the individual and the systematic channel. Especially changes in
beta around news releases have been linked to cross-company learning about profitability,
based on quarterly earnings announcements. This paper generalizes the results to the case
of voluntary disclosure (i.e. almost all other news except earnings announcements) and
shows that there is an additional aspect to non-earnings news. Due to different incentives
governing the voluntary release of good and bad news - it is always desirable to issue good
news but it often requires the crossing of a certain material threshold before bad news is
released - there is an asymmetry in the link between news tone and stock beta. While betas
increase significantly in periods with bad news, indicating that investors are learning about
other stocks from such news, there is no such effect for good news. The fact that there is
apparently not much to learn about other companies from good news of a particular com-
pany becomes clear when one considers that learning can only work if those other companies
do not release their own news - and they would release their own good news if they had
some. However, good news still affects the other systematic component of stock returns, the
alpha. This supports the earlier conclusions in that good news is not unimportant. Rather
its influence is limited to the announcing company.
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Table 3.1: Excess returns on news days
The Table presents basic news flow statistics for the whole sample as well as for relevant subsamples. The sample
period is April 2003 - December 2011. The variables used to construct the subsamples are:
• size, the average market capitalization
• analyst coverage, the number of analysts issuing forecasts before the most recent earnings announcement
• analyst dispersion, the standard deviation of forecasts issued before the most recent earnings announcement
• abnormal turnover, computed following Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) as described in the text
The ranking on size is updated at the end of June each year, the two analyst-based ranking after each earnings
announcement and the ranking on abnormal turnover at the end of every month. Mean excess returns are computed
from a regression of daily residuals from the Fama and French (1993) three factor model on dummies for positive,
neutral and negative news days respectively. The residuals are obtained from fitting the three-factor model to each
stock separately in each month. t-statistics are computed from standard errors clustered by stock and day.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
number of number of number of news days mean excess return on news days
quintile stocks news positive neutral negative positive neutral negative
Panel A: all stocks
1’898 1’440’844 124’856 297’828 145’368 0.21% 0.15% -0.19%
( 18.98 ) ( 21.50 ) ( -16.91 )
Panel B: by size
1 378 69’116 3’510 6’517 3’726 1.44% 1.07% 0.30%
( 9.02 ) ( 9.28 ) ( 1.52 )
2 480 112’842 4’405 9’038 4’766 0.66% 0.37% -0.27%
( 5.61 ) ( 6.11 ) ( -2.54 )
3 551 152’124 8’032 17’147 8’046 0.46% 0.29% -0.32%
( 9.28 ) ( 6.99 ) ( -4.87 )
4 793 239’800 22’480 52’799 22’355 0.24% 0.20% -0.32%
( 13.14 ) ( 11.73 ) ( -12.99 )
5 898 866’962 86’429 212’327 106’475 0.10% 0.09% -0.14%
( 15.83 ) ( 16.90 ) ( -15.97 )
Panel C: by analyst coverage
1 983 183’994 18’937 39’817 17’247 0.10% 0.11% -0.15%
( 8.49 ) ( 8.64 ) ( -7.89 )
2 1’367 202’667 20’104 45’929 20’955 0.17% 0.11% -0.16%
( 10.47 ) ( 8.14 ) ( -7.47 )
3 1’379 265’664 22’921 54’993 25’101 0.13% 0.15% -0.16%
( 9.99 ) ( 11.51 ) ( -8.33 )
4 1’287 319’773 23’915 60’210 30’223 0.17% 0.12% -0.19%
( 9.65 ) ( 9.72 ) ( -10.22 )
5 986 373’041 25’057 66’820 36’024 0.17% 0.14% -0.19%
( 11.22 ) ( 10.81 ) ( -9.93 )
Panel D: by analyst dispersion
1 1’022 191’023 18’470 37’946 17’004 0.12% 0.11% -0.07%
( 8.04 ) ( 9.53 ) ( -3.90 )
2 1’124 232’426 21’080 46’759 21’354 0.10% 0.10% -0.08%
( 9.75 ) ( 10.90 ) ( -5.97 )
3 1’176 243’770 22’163 52’334 23’422 0.12% 0.13% -0.13%
( 10.02 ) ( 12.55 ) ( -7.92 )
4 1’187 270’724 22’292 55’520 25’859 0.15% 0.12% -0.19%
( 12.04 ) ( 10.89 ) ( -12.12 )
5 1’007 354’800 19’328 58’981 35’388 0.31% 0.20% -0.39%
( 12.45 ) ( 10.49 ) ( -14.34 )
Panel E: by abnormal turnover
1 1’408 195’010 20’525 44’589 21’978 0.11% 0.10% -0.17%
( 8.12 ) ( 7.24 ) ( -7.20 )
2 1’393 276’012 25’119 58’427 27’846 0.11% 0.12% -0.14%
( 8.81 ) ( 10.20 ) ( -8.49 )
3 1’384 312’534 25’648 63’477 29’695 0.13% 0.12% -0.17%
( 10.68 ) ( 10.19 ) ( -10.05 )
4 1’388 307’694 25’186 62’735 29’869 0.15% 0.11% -0.18%
( 10.22 ) ( 9.28 ) ( -9.43 )
5 1’413 295’518 21’693 55’608 29’497 0.20% 0.15% -0.21%
( 8.79 ) ( 10.01 ) ( -9.44 )
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
The table presents mean values of size, monthly return as well as alpha and beta estimates from the short-window
CAPM regressions averaged across the whole sample and individual size quintiles. Because stocks can change their
size quintile over the sample period, the number of distinct stocks in the whole sample is less than the sum of distinct
stocks from all quintiles. Additionally, the number of months and the number of months with news is given - ’below
mean’ refers to months in which the number of news days was below the sample average for a particular stocks and
’above mean’ when it was equal to or above that average. The sample period is April 2003 - December 2011.
number mean size mean mean mean number with below above
of stocks ($ mln) return alpha beta of months news mean mean
Panel A: all stocks
1’420 2’018 1.38% 0.33% 1.176 116’139 101’372 65’611 35’761
Panel B: by size quintile
1 454 211 1.93% 0.74% 1.264 20’192 14’349 10’309 4’040
2 615 750 1.50% 0.19% 1.377 22’111 18’189 12’427 5’762
3 626 1’686 1.39% 0.27% 1.211 23’478 20’561 13’599 6’962
4 561 3’715 1.12% 0.22% 1.072 24’974 23’333 14’677 8’656
5 374 18’770 1.08% 0.28% 1.002 25’384 24’940 14’599 10’341
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Table 3.3: Beta and news
The table reports parameter estimates from the following regression:
βi,t = Intercepti,t + δ1 ·Newsi,t + δ2 · Sizei,t + i,t
where βi,t is the CAPM beta of stock i in month t calculated using daily returns within that month, Newsi,t is a
dummy variable equal 1 if stock i had at least one news day in month t (according to the Thomson Reuters News
Analytics database) and 0 otherwise, Sizei,t is the average of the natural logarithm of daily market capitalization
(price times shares outstanding) of stock i in month T . To account for varying intensity of news flow, models (3)-(5)
use two news dummies instead of one: News1i,T (News
2
i,T ) is equal to 1 if the number of news days for stock i in
month T is below (above) the average number for stock i over the entire sample period. The regression is estimated
using all stock-month observations over the sample period (April 2003 - December 2011). All regressions include firm
fixed effects. In models (1)-(4) the coefficient on the news dummy should be interpreted as the average difference in
beta between news months and no-news months. In model (5) it is the difference in beta between months with above
average news flow and months with either below average or no news flow pooled together. t-statistics appearing in
parentheses are computed from standard errors clustered by month.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
News 0.006 0.015 *
( 0.78 ) ( 2.14 )
News1 -0.001 0.007
( -0.17 ) ( 1.01 )
News2 0.022 ** 0.035 ** 0.029 **
( 2.81 ) ( 4.48 ) ( 6.47 )
Size -0.107 ** -0.108 ** -0.108 **
( -26.20 ) ( -26.42 ) ( -26.40 )
Nobs 116’139 116’139 116’139 116’139 116’139
R-squared 0.243 0.247 0.243 0.248 0.248
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Table 3.4: Cross-sectional impact of news on beta
The two panels of the table refer to the parameter estimates from the following regression:
βi,t = Intercepti,t + δ1 ·News2i,t + δ2 · Sizei,t + i,t
where βi,t is the CAPM beta of stock i in month t calculated using daily returns within that month, News
2
i,t is a
dummy variable equal 1 if the number of news days for stock i in month T was above the median number for that stock
over the entire sample period (see previous Table for a detailed discussion) and Sizei,t is the average of the natural
logarithm of daily market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) of stock i in month T . The regression are
estimated over the sample period (April 2003 - December 2011) for stocks sorted on various characteristics defined
in Table 3.1. All regressions include firm fixed effects. In models (1)-(4) the coefficient on the news dummy should
be interpreted as the average difference in beta between news months and no-news months. In model (5) it is the
difference in beta between months with above median coverage and months with either below median or no coverage
pooled together. t-statistics appearing in parentheses are clustered by month.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
abnormal analyst analyst
all stocks quintile size turnover coverage dispersion
Panel A: News2
0.029 ** 1 -0.017 0.015 0.004 -0.009
( 6.47 ) ( -0.98 ) ( 1.43 ) ( 0.40 ) ( -0.93 )
2 -0.002 0.014 0.009 -0.006
( -0.18 ) ( 1.56 ) ( 0.97 ) ( -0.58 )
3 0.017 0.037 ** 0.023 * 0.021 *
( 1.90 ) ( 4.12 ) ( 2.30 ) ( 2.20 )
4 0.021 ** 0.040 ** 0.032 ** 0.031 **
( 2.76 ) ( 4.26 ) ( 3.27 ) ( 3.08 )
5 0.036 ** 0.044 ** 0.050 ** 0.069 **
( 5.70 ) ( 3.51 ) ( 5.16 ) ( 5.97 )
Panel B: Size
-0.108 ** 1 0.102 ** -0.073 ** -0.140 ** -0.090 **
( -26.40 ) ( 8.11 ) ( -9.24 ) ( -11.04 ) ( -7.58 )
2 -0.051 ** -0.108 ** -0.105 ** -0.145 **
( -3.96 ) ( -12.30 ) ( -9.94 ) ( -12.15 )
3 -0.120 ** -0.097 ** -0.114 ** -0.176 **
( -9.72 ) ( -10.27 ) ( -11.05 ) ( -15.77 )
4 -0.154 ** -0.108 ** -0.111 ** -0.109 **
( -13.76 ) ( -11.05 ) ( -11.54 ) ( -9.83 )
5 -0.213 ** -0.146 ** -0.131 ** -0.173 **
( -23.43 ) ( -13.47 ) ( -14.15 ) ( -17.43 )
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Table 3.5: The impact of news tone on Beta
In this Table the baseline regression:
βi,t = Intercepti,t + δ1 ·News2i,t + δ2 · Sizei,t + i,t
is augmented by interacting the News2 variable with three dummies for positive, negative and neutral months. A month is
considered positive if it had at least one positive news day and no negative news days, irrespective of the number of neutral
news days. A negative month is defined analogously. All other months are considered neutral. The estimated coefficients are
differences between the beta in months with above average coverage (as defined in Table 3.3 and in the text) and the respective
tone, and other months. Panels A-D contain the results of the same analysis for subsamples related to the stocks exposure
to the broader economy, visibility, abnormal trading and uncertainty. Definitions of the ranking variables are given in Table
3.1. Sample period is April 2003 - December 2011. All regressions include firm fixed effects and t-statistics are computed from
standard errors clustered by month.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
all stocks
neg 0.048 **
( 5.91 )
pos 0.010
( 1.19 )
neut 0.028 **
( 5.04 )
quintuile 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: sorted on size
neg -0.020 -0.027 0.034 * 0.039 ** 0.094 **
( -0.72 ) ( -1.35 ) ( 2.12 ) ( 2.77 ) ( 7.35 )
pos -0.032 0.001 0.006 0.015 -0.010
( -1.06 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 1.10 ) ( -0.68 )
neut -0.004 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.030 **
( -0.16 ) ( 0.67 ) ( 1.25 ) ( 1.78 ) ( 4.21 )
Panel B: sorted on analyst coverage
neg 0.021 -0.003 0.014 0.050 ** 0.088 **
( 1.08 ) ( -0.16 ) ( 0.77 ) ( 2.79 ) ( 5.42 )
pos -0.008 0.022 0.018 -0.011 0.025
( -0.50 ) ( 1.27 ) ( 0.98 ) ( -0.60 ) ( 1.26 )
neut 0.004 0.009 0.028 * 0.041 ** 0.039 **
( 0.32 ) ( 0.71 ) ( 2.28 ) ( 3.37 ) ( 3.29 )
Panel C: sorted on abnormal turnover
neg 0.022 0.012 0.074 ** 0.073 ** 0.059 **
( 1.10 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 4.33 ) ( 4.20 ) ( 2.82 )
pos 0.020 0.014 0.017 -0.001 0.020
( 1.04 ) ( 0.80 ) ( 0.97 ) ( -0.05 ) ( 0.85 )
neut 0.009 0.015 0.031 ** 0.042 ** 0.047 **
( 0.71 ) ( 1.32 ) ( 2.76 ) ( 3.66 ) ( 3.02 )
Panel D: sorted on analyst dispersion
neg -0.001 0.014 0.022 0.031 0.099 **
( -0.06 ) ( 0.70 ) ( 1.22 ) ( 1.67 ) ( 5.27 )
pos -0.010 0.006 0.015 0.012 0.050
( -0.61 ) ( 0.32 ) ( 0.84 ) ( 0.61 ) ( 1.98 )
neut -0.011 -0.017 0.023 * 0.038 ** 0.059 **
( -0.93 ) ( -1.42 ) ( 1.96 ) ( 3.05 ) ( 4.19 )
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Table 3.6: The impact of news tone on Alpha
In this Table an analogous procedure as for stock beta is applied to explain stock alpha. That is the baseline regression:
αi,t = Intercepti,t + δ1 ·News2i,t + δ2 · Sizei,t + i,t
is augmented by interacting the News2 variable with three dummies for positive, negative and neutral months. A month is
considered positive if it had at least one positive news day and no negative news days, irrespective of the number of neutral
news days. A negative month is defined analogously. All other months are considered neutral. The estimated coefficients are
differences between the alpha in months with above average coverage (as defined in Table 3.3 and in the text) and the respective
tone, and other months. Panels A-D contain the results of the same analysis for subsamples related to the stocks exposure
to the broader economy, visibility, abnormal trading and uncertainty. Definitions of the ranking variables are given in Table
3.1. Sample period is April 2003 - December 2011. All regressions include firm fixed effects and t-statistics are computed from
standard errors clustered by month.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
all stocks
neg -0.94%
( -6.93 )
pos 1.42%
( 10.23 )
neut 0.09%
( 1.02 )
quintuile 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: sorted on size
neg -0.33% -1.51% ** -0.79% ** -0.76% ** -0.62% **
( -0.65 ) ( -4.40 ) ( -2.95 ) ( -3.35 ) ( -3.14 )
pos 2.52% ** 1.33% ** 1.48% ** 1.14% ** 0.85% **
( 4.68 ) ( 3.85 ) ( 5.80 ) ( 5.28 ) ( 3.59 )
neut 0.45% 0.42% 0.08% 0.02% 0.04%
( 1.02 ) ( 1.58 ) ( 0.39 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.40 )
Panel B: sorted on analyst coverage
neg -0.60% -0.61% -0.43% -0.75% ** -1.43% **
( -1.87 ) ( -1.87 ) ( -1.41 ) ( -2.54 ) ( -4.92 )
pos 1.16% ** 1.05% ** 1.32% ** 1.56% ** 1.59% **
( 4.27 ) ( 3.46 ) ( 4.43 ) ( 5.13 ) ( 4.45 )
neut -0.15% 0.02% 0.16% 0.08% 0.16%
( -0.77 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.77 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 0.78 )
Panel C: sorted on abnormal turnover
neg -0.46% -0.46% -0.13% -0.95% ** -2.46% **
( -1.56 ) ( -1.77 ) ( -0.48 ) ( -3.46 ) ( -6.16 )
pos 1.01% ** 0.75% ** 0.92% ** 1.39% ** 2.15% **
( 3.51 ) ( 2.97 ) ( 3.53 ) ( 4.93 ) ( 4.89 )
neut 0.31% 0.04% 0.05% 0.16% -0.38%
( 1.57 ) ( 0.27 ) ( 0.27 ) ( 0.86 ) ( -1.28 )
Panel D: sorted on analyst dispersion
neg -1.51% ** -0.73% * -0.99% -0.08% -1.34% **
( -4.80 ) ( -2.28 ) ( -3.10 ) ( -0.24 ) ( -3.84 )
pos 1.35% ** 1.30% ** 1.49% ** 0.88% ** 1.30% **
( 4.92 ) ( 4.39 ) ( 4.70 ) ( 2.47 ) ( 2.78 )
neut -0.14% 0.39% 0.10% 0.02% -0.10%
( -0.74 ) ( 1.90 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.07 ) ( -0.40 )
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Table 3.7: Robustness checks
In this Table the results concerning the impact of news tone on alpha and beta are investigated for robustness to including more
control variables (lagged beta, stock idiosyncratic volatility, market volatility and raw turnover), separating months containing
earnings announcements and other months as well as changing the way positive and negative months are categorized (described
in the text). Sample period is April 2003 - December 2011. All regressions include firm fixed effects and t-statistics are computed
from standard errors clustered by month.
Significance levels: * - 5%, ** - 1%
adding more excluding excluding non- using different
control variables earnings months -earnings months measure of tone
alpha beta alpha beta alpha beta alpha beta
Panel A: all news
News2 0.012 ** 0.026 ** 0.048 **
( 2.86 ) ( 4.77 ) ( 5.92 )
Panel B: separating by news tone
neg -1.30% ** 0.019 ** -1.05% ** 0.037 ** -0.97% ** 0.081 ** -2.50% ** 0.060 **
( -9.58 ) ( 2.45 ) ( -5.91 ) ( 3.45 ) ( -4.15 ) ( 6.04 ) ( -10.50 ) ( 4.22 )
pos 1.31% ** 0.001 1.19% ** 0.002 1.41% ** 0.038 ** 1.24% ** 0.010
( 9.50 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 7.07 ) ( 0.22 ) ( 5.37 ) ( 2.54 ) ( 10.78 ) ( 1.50 )
neut -0.02% 0.014 ** 0.06% 0.032 ** -0.06% 0.037 ** -0.15% 0.035 **
( -0.20 ) ( 2.58 ) ( 0.49 ) ( 4.65 ) ( -0.34 ) ( 3.85 ) ( -1.67 ) ( 6.50 )
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Abstract
Using a large data set in which the language of millions of firm-specific news items has
been quantified, we construct two novel measures: The aggregate level of news tone and
the aggregate dispersion of news tone. High level of news tone is associated with good
economic times, high returns, and low volatility. High dispersion of news tone is linked to
bad economic times, low returns, and high volatility. We interpret the level and dispersion
of news tone as high-frequency measures of economic conditions and economic uncertainty.
The two measures forecast aggregate stock returns, realized variance, and the variance risk
premium, controlling for various economic and financial variables. Our results suggest that
soft firm-specific news matter for aggregate stock prices, in excess of hard information.
89
4.1 Introduction
The literature on how hard and quantifiable firm-specific information, such as company
earnings, impacts stock prices is vast. However, a more recent and growing literature ana-
lyzes how soft information in company news can be quantified and how it relates to earnings
and stock prices. For example, Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2006), Engelberg (2008), Tetlock,
Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008), and Demers and Vega (2011) all demonstrate that
the tone of firm-specific news items impact stock returns around announcements and pre-
dicts future firm earnings and returns. Tetlock (2007) analyzes the content of a popular
Wall Street Journal column, ”Abreast of the Market”, using more than 70 word categories
from the Harvard IV-4 dictionary and shows that the first principal component constructed
from those categories, which loads most heavily on words labeled as negative, predicts lower
index returns.
Our contribution is to develop a bottom-up approach of combining the tone of millions
of company-specific news items into two measures of aggregate news tone: The aggregate
level of news tone and the aggregate dispersion of news tone. We make use of a database
provided by Thomson Reuters News Analytics which contains news tone scores, obtained
through linguistic analysis, for all company-specific news announcements released during
the period Jan 2003-Dec 2011. Our daily measure of the aggregate level of news tone is
constructed by summing the firm-specific news tones across stocks while our measure of
daily aggregate news tone dispersion corresponds to the standard deviation of firm-specific
news tones across all firms. We also construct corresponding measures on a monthly horizon.
We find a significant negative correlation between the level of aggregate news tone
and the dispersion. Moreover, we find that the level of aggregate news tone is positively
associated with economic activity and S&P 500 returns while being negatively related to
the realized volatility of aggregate stock returns. In contrast, the aggregate dispersion of
news tone is negatively correlated with economic activity and aggregate stock returns and
positively related to stock market volatility. Furthermore, our two measures are correlated
with core financial and economic variables like the VIX index, the Michigan sentiment index,
abnormal turnover, changes in aggregate company earnings, and dispersion of earnings
forecasts. Interestingly, our two variables are less correlated with the investor sentiment
measures developed in Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2007). This
suggests that the aggregate level and dispersion of news tone more reflect rational market
forces rather than irrational or sentimental factors.
We find that the level and dispersion of aggregate news tone predict future aggregate
stock market returns and realized volatility over both daily and monthly horizons, control-
ling for various economic and financial variables. Our news tone measures also predict the
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variance risk premium, indicating that news tone captures a notion of economic uncertainty.
Overall, the results indicate that soft firm-specific news matter for aggregate stock prices, in
excess of hard information. Most of the predictive power of news tone comes from the dis-
persion variable which predicts returns negatively and volatility positively. We interpret the
dispersion variable as a measure of aggregate information uncertainty since it increases in
periods when company news are highly contradictory, with some firms experiencing positive
news tones and others negative news tones. Therefore, our findings suggest that aggregate
uncertainty about soft firm-specific information matters for aggregate stock prices.
The layout of our paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents
the empirical analysis and results. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 Data
We construct aggregate measures of news tone and news dispersion using a bottom-up
approach. The departing point is the collection of all company-specific news announcements
obtained from Thomson Reuters News Analytics. This extensive archive contains all news
published either by Reuters or by the companies themselves (via direct outlets like the PR
Newswire) in the period between 2003 and 2011.
Each time a company is mentioned in the news, its identifier (Reuters Instrument Code,
or RIC) is recorded, together with a precise timestamp. In particular, this means that
whenever a news announcement mentions several companies one record per company is
created. This is important, because the presentation of each company might be different
within the same news story, e.g. good news for Company A might be bad news for its
competitors etc. Similarly, the relevance of the news story for each company might be
different e.g. with Company A being the main focus of attention, perhaps already named
in the headline, while its competitors are only briefly mentioned later in the text.
The linguistic analysis we make use of is capable of grasping such differences. The
algorithm developed for this purpose by Thomson Reuters works at the sentence level,
identifying the subject (company) and any tone-relevant words related to it. The two
procedures it is based on, Named Entity Recognition (NER) and Parts-of-Speech Tagging
(POS), have both become standard tools and are widely used in content analysis (e.g.,
Jurafsky and Martin (2008)). Thus, we are able to track the tone of the news for each
company separately, even if they are mentioned in the same text. Another advantage of
this algorithm is that it attempts to make sense of syntactic relationship in determining
the tone of the news, represented as a classification variable: +1 for positive, 0 for neutral
and -1 for negative tone. This can be achieved either by defining explicit grammatical
rules (such algorithms are then called deductive) or by supplying a training set evaluated
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by human ”teachers”, from which the algorithm inductively infers the relevant rules. The
News Analytics algorithm belongs to the second type but in both cases the potential gains
with respect to the basic ”bag of words” approach are substantial. Also, contrary to what is
sometimes said, syntactic approaches are not any more subjective than ”bag of words”. In
fact, surveys of methods of content analysis assign all of them to the family of ”supervised
approaches”, indicating human involvement in their design. This is because the dictionaries,
which are behind any ”bag of words” analysis have to be created by humans. Even inductive
algorithms offer a fair degree of inter-subjective reliability, because the learning sets are
always evaluated by more than one person and the results of learning are only accepted
when the agreement between the instructors and the machine but also among the instructors
themselves reaches a certain, appropriately high threshold. In the News Analytics database
this is reflected by three ”tone probability” scores, which show how likely each news item
was to receive one of the three tone labels: positive, neutral or negative (the one assigned
is simply the one with the highest probability).
The basic building block of our aggregation is the news tone for company i on day t,
which is computed as follows:
Tonei,t =
kpos∑
k=1
1 · prob posi,t,k +
kneg∑
k=1
(−1) · prob negi,t,k. (4.1)
That is, all positive news items (indicated by +1) for company i on day t are multiplied
by the probability of being classified as positive and summed and similarly for negative
news items. Adding the two sums for positive and negative news produces a measure of the
difference between the positive and negative content published about company i on day t.
It will be positive if there were more positive news items and/or if the positive news items
had a higher probability, prob pos, attached to them, and negative otherwise. The greater
the number of news about company i on day t the greater the potential magnitude of the
news tone in the case of a significant imbalance between positive and negative news. For
this reason companies with a lot of news flow are more likely to register very high or very
low values of news tone.
Our first core measure captures the daily (D superscript below) level of aggregate news
tone and makes use of the fact that the individual company tones in Eq. 4.1 are additive:
AggToneDt =
n∑
i=1
Tonei,t =
=
n∑
i=1
kpos∑
k=1
1 · prob posi,t,k +
n∑
i=1
kneg∑
k=1
(−1) · prob negi,t,k
(4.2)
92
which is the daily imbalance between positive and negative news for all companies n, having
news on day t. Thus, companies with a large news flow, that is big companies or those
with important events going on, will generally contribute more to the aggregate measure,
which is quite similar to using value weighting in constructing price indices and ensures
that aggregate news tone is not driven by small, less relevant stocks. For the purpose
of computing the daily aggregate tone, we use the period starting at 4pm on calendar
day t − 1 (i.e. yesterday’s close) and ending at 3:45pm on calendar day t (i.e. 15 minutes
before today’s close). This ensures that our measure reflects the information available to
an investor wishing to trade on news tone before the market closes on day t.1
While our measure of the level of aggregate news tone reflects the first moment of news
tone, one could also imagine a measure which captures the second moment of news tone.
Such a measure is important to consider since the level of aggregate news tone does not
necessarily provide a complete picture of the current information flow. To see this, consider
the following two situations: (1) there is little news overall, i.e. not much information is
entering the market, (2) there are a lot of highly polarized news items where companies
with positive news items are offset by companies with negative news. Both cases produce
an aggregate level of news tone close to zero although they are admittedly very different
from the viewpoint of investors. For an investor wanting to form an opinion about the
aggregate market using firm-specific news, the first case represents few signals overall while
the second case represents a large number of contradictory signals. In the latter case, each
firm-specific signal can be precise but aggregating a dispersed set of signals produces high
uncertainty about the aggregate market. To account for these possibilities, we supplement
our level measure of news tone with a measure of daily news tone dispersion, defined as the
standard deviation of firm-specific news tones at date t :
AggDispDt = Std(Tonei,t) (4.3)
We also construct monthly level and dispersion measures. The monthly (M superscript
below) aggregate level of news tone is simply the sum of daily aggregate levels during that
particular month.
AggToneMt =
T∑
t=1
(AggToneDt ), (4.4)
where T equals the number of days in a given month. The monthly news tone dispersion
is constructed by first computing monthly measures of firm-specific news tones, done by
summing all daily news tone observations within each month for each company i, and then
1It makes little difference to our results if one instead uses close-to-close information.
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taking the standard deviation of these monthly firm-specific news tones:
AggDispMt = Std(
T∑
t=1
Tonei,t), (4.5)
where T again equals the number of days in a given month.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 plot the dynamics of the daily and monthly measures of the aggregate
level and dispersion of news tone for our sample period January 2003 to December 2011. We
have winsorized the series at the 1st and 99th percentiles in order to mitigate the influence
of large outliers. We have then standardized all series by demeaning and dividing by the
standard deviation, in order to ease the interpretation. Two things are apparent from the
pictures. First, the level of aggregate news tone (upper panel in both figures) exhibits
substantial variation over time. The aggregate news tone increased leading up to the onset
of the financial crisis in mid-2007, then dropped sharply in 2008 and rebounded in 2009. The
renewed sharp drop in news tone in 2011 coincides with the European sovereign debt crisis.
Second, the level and dispersion (lower panel in both figures) of news tone appear negatively
correlated. Dispersion is generally low when tone is increasing and registers several large
spikes when tone is at its lowest. This is reminiscent of the asymmetric volatility effect (e.g.,
Bekaert and Wu (2000)) and suggests that high volatility in bad times might be partly due to
contradictory company news. This link becomes even more suggestive when aggregate tone
and dispersion (at the monthly frequency) are plotted against the most popular measure of
expected volatility, the VIX index (Figure 4.3). The apparent negative correlation between
aggregate tone and the VIX and the positive correlation between aggregate dispersion and
the VIX persists not only during the financial crisis but also before and after. In fact, the
graph suggests that aggregate dispersion leads the VIX by one month, in particular for the
large changes during the sample period.
Since we are interested in understanding whether soft firm-specific information matters
beyond hard information, we include a broad range of variables which reflect economic and
financial conditions. The first is the variance risk premium (VP), defined as the difference
between implied and realized variance, and which is often interpreted as a measure of
economic uncertainty. Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) demonstrate that the variance
risk premium has predictive power for stock returns in excess of traditional predictors such
as price-earnings ratios. As a monthly measure of economic activity we use the Chicago-
Fed National Activity index which is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Park (2005) show the importance of dispersion
of earnings forecasts as a proxy for different expectations of fundamentals at the individual
and aggregate level respectively. Following Park (2005) we obtain the dispersion of 12-
month-ahead forecasts for the aggregate earnings of S&P 500 firms from IBES. We also
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use information on the actual aggregate earnings of S&P 500 firms. Data on the VIX
index is downloaded from Datastream. The Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions
Index (ADS) is used as it measures economic activity on a daily basis and is obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The University of Michigan sentiment index
is retrieved from Datastream. We also consider abnormal turnover which is computed
as follows. First, we compute turnover as the ratio of daily shares volume and shares
outstanding. To reduce the skewness of the turnover distribution we use logarithms and
to avoid the problem of zero turnover we follow the method applied in Llorente, Michaely,
Saar, and Wang (2002) and add a small positive constant to each raw turnover value.2 We
then compute abnormal turnover as the difference between log turnover on day t and a 60-
day moving average of log turnover. Finally, we relate the level and dispersion of aggregate
news tone to the investor sentiment measures obtained from the website of Jeffrey Wurgler.
Aggregate stock market returns are measured using returns on the widely traded ex-
change traded fund that tracks S&P 500, SPY, and which represents returns that are
obtainable by investors in practice. The returns are obtained from Datastream. Daily and
monthly excess returns are computed using Fama’s one-month Treasury-bill rate obtained
from CRSP. For computing daily excess returns, we assume that the one-month rate is
constant within each month. We also use daily and monthly data on the realized vari-
ance of the S&P500 downloaded from the data library of the Oxford-Man Institute and
from the website of Hao Zhou respectively (see Zhou (2010)). We also consider information
potentially contained in past prices. Apart from lagged values of returns and volatilities,
we construct a measure of return dispersion, which mimics the news dispersion introduced
earlier. It is the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns (either daily or monthly) of
all constituents of the S&P 500 index. Thus, we can control whether the dispersion in news
tone merely reflects the fact that some companies were performing well and others poorly
in the past.
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of our daily variables and daily correlations between
our two news tone measures and remaining variables. The table shows that both the level
and dispersion of aggregate news tone exhibit excess kurtosis but the level of news tone
is negatively skewed whereas the dispersion measure is positively skewed. Both measures
are subject to similar persistence with daily autocorrelation coefficients of 0.70 and 0.66
for level and dispersion respectively. The second panel demonstrates that the daily level
and dispersion measures are negatively correlated, -0.27. Interestingly, both measures are
significantly correlated with realized and implied volatility (VIX). A higher aggregate tone
is associated with lower stock return volatility while higher dispersion is linked to higher
2The magnitude of this constant, 0.00000255, is chosen as to make the distribution of turnover closer to
normal (e.g., Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986).
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volatility.
Table 4.2 reports monthly summary statistics and correlations. The monthly skewness
and kurtosis of the two tone measures are similar to their daily values while the persistence
of tone level is higher than that for dispersion, 0.84 versus 0.51 in first-order autocorrelation
coefficients. The persistence decays to around 0.30 for both measures when using five lags.
The second panel demonstrates that the level and dispersion measures are highly negatively
correlated, -0.50, and have opposite relations to stock returns and volatility. While the level
of news tone is positively related to stock returns and negatively related to volatility, higher
dispersion is instead related to lower returns and higher volatility. The two news tone
measures also carry significant correlations with a range of economic variables. Higher
news tone is associated with higher economic activity, higher consumer sentiment, lower
turnover, lower dispersion of earnings forecasts, and positive changes to realized earnings.
On the other hand, higher dispersion of news tone implies the opposite sign in correlations.
Simply put, higher level of news tone indicates good economic times, high returns, and
low volatility while higher dispersion indicates bad economic times, low returns, and high
volatility.
In Table 4.3, we relate our news tone variables to the four investor sentiment measures
used in Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2007). Interestingly, the mag-
nitude of the correlation coefficients are all low and significantly lower than correlations
between news tone and the economic variables presented earlier. A possible interpretation
is that the aggregate level and dispersion of news tone more reflect rational market forces
rather than irrational or sentimental factors.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
The last section demonstrated that the level and dispersion of news tone are contem-
poraneously related to returns, volatility, and various economic and financial variables. In
this section, we analyze whether our news tone measures, which quantify ”soft” company-
specific information, carry any incremental information beyond ”hard” data. In order to do
so, we test whether our news tone measures have any predictive power for aggregate stock
returns, realized variance, and the variance risk premium, controlling for various economic
and financial variables. We run both daily and monthly regressions using various specifica-
tions. We consider three specifications for each dependent variable. The first specification
uses the aggregate level and dispersion of news tone as independent variables. The sec-
ond specification uses a number of variables capturing hard information, reflecting current
economic and financial conditions and the third specification includes all variables jointly,
resulting in a ”horse race” between soft and hard information.
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4.3.1 Predicting Aggregate Stock Returns
Dependent variables for the return regressions are daily and monthly excess returns
on the S&P 500, measured by the widely traded exchange-traded fund SPY. Table 4.4
presents results from predicting daily excess stock returns. The first column indicates
that the dispersion of news tone predicts returns negatively with a statistically significant
coefficient. Since the tone measures are standardized, the regression coefficient implies that
a one standard deviation increase in dispersion predicts a decrease in returns of 9 basis points
the next day. The R2-value is 0.34% which might seem small but which is non-negligible for
a daily horizon. The second column presents results from predicting returns with changes
in the ADS index, the VIX index, and past returns. Past returns predict returns with a
significant negative coefficient indicating mean reversion in daily returns. The R2-value is
1.62%. The third column presents results from including all variables jointly. The dispersion
measure turns out highly statistically significant and the R2-value increases, indicating that
aggregate dispersion of news tone matters. It is also not subsumed by return dispersion,
indicating that past returns do not fully reflect past news.
Table 4.5 presents results from predicting monthly excess returns. The first column
demonstrates that monthly dispersion of news tone carries predictive power for future re-
turns with a statistically significant coefficient of -1.40. This implies that a one standard
deviation increase in monthly dispersion predicts a drop in returns of 1.40% next month.
The monthly R2-value is 6.37%. The second column shows that predicting monthly returns
with a range of economic and financial variables yields a lower R2-value and statistically
insignificant coefficients. Including all variables jointly increases the explanatory power and
produces only one statistically significant coefficient, the dispersion of news tone.
4.3.2 Predicting Realized Variance
This section presents results from predicting the daily and monthly realized variance of
S&P 500 returns. Table 4.6 presents results from the daily regressions. The first column
indicates that both the level and dispersion of news tone matter for future volatility since
both regression coefficients are highly significant. The results show that the level and
dispersion have opposite effects on volatility. Higher news tone predicts lower volatility
while higher news dispersion predicts higher volatility. The second column shows that
past volatility and returns have great predictive power for future volatility. Including all
variables jointly renders the news tone variables insignificant. Hence, while daily aggregate
news tone predicts daily future volatility with significant coefficients, the two aggregate news
tone measures seem to carry no extra information beyond lagged volatility and returns.
Next, we predict monthly realized variance of stock returns. Table 4.7 shows that the
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two news tone measures predict realized variance with a R2 value of almost 42% and with
both coefficients highly significant. As with daily data, higher level (dispersion) predicts
volatility negatively (positively). The second column demonstrates that predicting volatility
with only economic and financial variables produce similar explanatory power as with the
tone measures. Interestingly, higher economic activity measured by the Chicago Fed Index
(Fed) predicts volatility negatively. Results from including all variables jointly suggest that
the dispersion of news tone adds information in excess of the other variables. The coefficient
on dispersion is positive and highly significant, and the explanatory power increases to
around 53%.
Overall, the predictability results indicate that the level and dispersion of news tone have
predictive power in excess of economic and financial variables. The dispersion measure in
particular seems to contain important information for returns and volatility. The results
suggest that more contradictory company news across firms predicts low returns and high
volatility, indicating that aggregate information uncertainty matters for equity prices.
4.3.3 Predicting the Variance Risk Premium
The fact that dispersion of company news tone is a significantly positive predictor of
market volatility supports its interpretation as a measure of economic uncertainty. At the
same time, negative news are associated with an increase in volatility (the well known
asymmetric volatility effect), suggesting an inverse relationship between the level of news
tone and information uncertainty. To examine this intuition more closely, we relate our
measures to the variance risk premium (VP), originally put forward by Bollerslev, Tauchen,
and Zhou (2009). It is computed at the end of each month t as the difference between
forward-looking volatility for month t+ 1, implied from prices of index options on the S&P
500 (approximated in a model-free way using the VIX), and backward-looking realized
volatility for month t, computed as the sum of squared high-frequency returns on the same
index.
The variance risk premium has often been interpreted as a measure of economic uncer-
tainty. We are interested in understanding how the variance risk premium relates to the
level and dispersion of aggregate news tone. If the variance risk premium reflects current
uncertainty, then it could presumably be interpreted as an indirect measure of current infor-
mation uncertainty. In contrast, by aggregating and quantifying the tone of company news,
we are able to provide a direct measure of information uncertainty, potentially leading the
variance risk premium.
We start by analyzing lead-lag correlations between the variance risk premium and the
aggregate level and dispersion of news tone in Figure 4.4. In both panels of the figure, the
variance risk premium is held constant at time t while we vary the news tone measures.
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For example, the lead-lag correlation at horizon −5 refers to the correlation between the
variance risk premium at time t and news tone at time t− 5. The results seem to confirm
our intuition. The top figure shows that the aggregate level of news tone leads the variance
risk premium with a negative sign indicating that a drop in the level of news tone signals
an increase in future variance risk premiums. For positive horizons, the correlations quickly
go towards zero suggesting that the variance risk premium has a lower ability to lead
the level of news tone than vice versa. The bottom figure demonstrates that the aggregate
dispersion of news tone also has the ability to lead movements in the variance risk premium.
Higher dispersion in company news signals higher future variance risk premiums. Again,
correlations for positive horizons go towards zero suggesting the variance risk premium only
leads dispersion of company news to a small extent. These findings suggest that our news
tone measures should have predictive power for future variance risk premiums.
We test this by running monthly predictive regressions using the variance risk premium
as dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 4.8 and indicate that both measures
of news tone significantly predict the variance risk premium, both having the expected
sign. Higher level of news tone predicts a lower future variance risk premium, while higher
dispersion of news tone predicts an increase in the variance risk premium. This suggest
that direct ways of measuring information and information uncertainty, as in our news tone
variables, predict future values of more indirect measures such as the variance risk premium.
Moreover, the effect of news tone is not subsumed by the control variables, even though news
dispersion loses some of its initial significance (now significant on the 10%-level). Overall,
the results support the notion of the level and dispersion of aggregate news tone as being
direct measures of information and information uncertainty.
4.4 Conclusions
We demonstrate that the tone of firm-specific news has systematic effects on the prices
of not only individual stocks but also the market indices. Using a large data base in which
the language of millions of individual news items has been quantified, we use a bottom-up
approach and construct two novel measures: The aggregate level of news tone and the
aggregate dispersion of news tone. We find that a higher level of aggregate news tone is
associated with higher economic activity, higher aggregate returns, and lower aggregate
stock volatility, while the aggregate dispersion of news tone has the opposite effects. We
interpret the aggregate level and dispersion of news tone as high-frequency measures of
economic conditions and economic uncertainty.
Importantly, both the level and dispersion of aggregate news tone predict future aggre-
gate stock returns, volatility, and variance risk premiums, controlling for a host of macroe-
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conomic and fundamental variables. Thus, quantifying the language of company-specific
news carries valuable information about the aggregate stock market, not contained in hard
data. However, this does not mean that news tone represents irrational investor sentiment.
In fact, it is only weakly correlated with the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006).
Instead, we argue it represents the ”soft” part of fundamentals, reflecting the overall level
and uncertainty about company information, driving rational investor uncertainty.
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Table 4.1: Daily Summary Statistics and Correlations
Daily Summary Statistics
Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis AC(1) AC(5)
AggToneD 184 228 –0.89 6.28 0.70 0.68
AggDispD 2.22 0.77 3.69 39.01 0.66 0.51
SP500 Ret 0.02 1.36 –0.29 12.72 –0.12 –0.05
SP500 RV 1.41 3.25 9.73 164 0.69 0.57
VIX 21.3 10.29 2.05 8.59 0.98 0.95
∆ADS 0.00 0.03 –0.11 17.70 0.65 0.78
DispRet 1.84 0.92 2.83 10.7 0.78 0.72
Daily Correlations
AggToneD AggDispD SP500 Ret SP500 RV VIX ∆ADS DispRet
AggToneD 1.00 –0.27 0.04 –0.42 –0.60 –0.01 -0.52
AggDispD –0.27 1.00 –0.03 0.27 0.40 0.05 0.38
The table reports daily summary statistics for the sample period Jan 2003-Dec 2011. AggToneD is
calculated daily as the weighted difference of positive and negative news about US companies. AggDispD
is the cross-sectional standard deviation of Tone, which is calculated daily for each company separately.
SP500 Ret, SP500 RV and VIX are the daily return, daily realized volatility and daily implied volatility
of the S&P 500 respectively. ∆ADS is the daily change in the economic activity index of Aruoba,
Diebold, and Scotti (2009)
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Table 4.3: Correlations with Baker-Wurgler Investor Sentiment
Sent⊥ Sent ∆Sent⊥ ∆Sent
AggToneM 0.19 0.22 0.13 –0.25
AggDispM 0.16 –0.02 –0.28 0.04
The table shows unconditional correlations coefficients between our aggregate measures of news tone and
investor sentiment factors computed by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007). Sent is computed as the first
principal component of six variables (closed-end fund discount, the number of IPOs, first-day returns on
IPOs, equity share in new issues, abnormal turnover and dividend premium) and Sent⊥ is additionally
orthogonalized with respect to several macroeconomic variables. ∆Sent and ∆Sent⊥ are computed as
the first principal component of the changes in the abovementioned variables. The investor sentiment
data is taken from the website of Jeffrey Wurgler which also contains descriptions of the variables. The
sample period is 2003-2010.
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Table 4.4: Predicting Daily Stock Returns
Ret(t+1) Ret(t+1) Ret(t+1)
AggToneD(t) 0.00 0.05
( -0.08 ) ( 1.47 )
AggDispD(t) -0.09 -0.10
( -3.01 ) ( -3.37 )
∆ADS(t) -1.86 -1.78
( -1.68 ) ( -1.61 )
VIX(t) 0.01 0.01
( 1.56 ) ( 2.59 )
Ret(t) -0.09 -0.09
( -4.36 ) ( -4.34 )
Ret(t-1) -0.09 -0.08
( -4.13 ) ( -4.01 )
DispRet(t) -0.08 -0.05
( -1.85 ) ( -1.12 )
R2adj(%) 1.62 1.73 2.24
T-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using Newey-West (1987) with 10 lags. Dependent
variable is the daily excess return on the S&P 500 exchange traded fund SPY.
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Table 4.5: Predicting Monthly Stock Returns
Ret(t+1) Ret(t+1) Ret(t+1)
AggToneM (t) -0.22 -0.53
( -0.46 ) ( -0.74 )
AggDispM (t) -1.33 -1.27
( -2.77 ) ( -2.31 )
Fed(t) 0.88 0.73
( 1.26 ) ( 1.03 )
∆Earn(t) -0.14 -0.14
( -0.74 ) ( -0.75 )
DispEarn(t) -5.78 -1.26
( -0.87 ) ( -0.17 )
VP(t) 0.08 0.09
( 2.62 ) ( 2.77 )
Ret(t) 0.27 0.23
( 2.49 ) ( 2.06 )
DispRet(t) -0.01 -0.06
( -0.03 ) ( -0.20 )
R2adj(%) 5.98 9.15 12.19
T-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using Newey-West (1987) with 5 lags. Dependent
variable is the one-month excess return on the S&P 500 exchange traded fund SPY.
106
Table 4.6: Predicting Daily Realized Variance
RV(t+1) RV(t+1) RV(t+1)
AggToneD(t) -1.15 0.06
( -17.98 ) ( 1.05 )
AggDispD(t) 0.53 0.00
( 8.20 ) ( 0.07 )
∆ADS(t) -1.11 -1.14
( -0.67 ) ( -0.69 )
VIX(t) 0.05 0.06
( 7.77 ) ( 7.48 )
RV(t) 0.23 0.23
( 10.95 ) ( 10.91 )
RV(t-1) 0.35 0.35
( 17.60 ) ( 17.51 )
Ret(t) -0.46 -0.46
( -13.86 ) ( -13.85 )
Ret(t-1) -0.23 -0.23
( -7.30 ) ( -7.31 )
DispRet(t) 0.36 0.37
( 5.02 ) ( 5.05 )
R2adj(%) 18.39 63.18 63.17
T-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using Newey-West (1987) with 10 lags.Dependent
variable is the daily realized variance of the S&P 500 obtained from the Oxford Man Institute.
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Table 4.7: Predicting Monthly Realized Variance
RV(t+1) RV(t+1) RV(t+1)
AggToneM (t) -15.44 -5.27
( -3.27 ) ( -0.77 )
AggDispM (t) 26.14 20.53
( 5.53 ) ( 4.03 )
Fed(t) -11.38 -8.28
( -1.56 ) ( -1.21 )
∆Earn(t) 0.65 0.47
( 0.36 ) ( 0.28 )
DispEarn(t) -7.85 -15.47
( -0.12 ) ( -0.22 )
VP(t) -0.07 -0.16
( -0.23 ) ( -0.55 )
RV(t) 0.37 0.33
( 3.05 ) ( 2.92 )
RV(t-1) -0.19 -0.28
( -1.80 ) ( -2.70 )
Ret(t) -3.15 -2.25
( -2.61 ) ( -1.97 )
DispRet(t) 4.63 2.05
( 1.88 ) ( 0.72 )
R2adj(%) 41.89 45.16 52.19
T-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using Newey-West (1987) with 5 lags. Dependent
variable is the realized variance of S&P 500 returns obtained from the website of Hao Zhou.
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Table 4.8: Predicting Monthly Variance Risk Premia
VP(t+1) VP(t+1) VP(t+1)
AggToneM (t) -4.39 -8.04
( -2.73 ) ( -3.72 )
AggDispM (t) 5.23 3.38
( 3.25 ) ( 2.01 )
Fed(t) -1.96 0.68
( -0.85 ) ( 0.31 )
∆Earn(t) 1.11 0.88
( 1.82 ) ( 1.56 )
DispEarn(t) 77.05 109.40
( 3.54 ) ( 4.81 )
VP(t) -0.05 -0.10
( -0.48 ) ( -1.04 )
Ret(t) -0.49 -0.06
( -1.39 ) ( -0.18 )
DispRet(t) 0.14 -2.45
( 0.18 ) ( -2.56 )
R2adj(%) 24.07 26.46 38.43
T-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using Newey-West (1987) with 5 lags. Dependent
variable is the monthly variance risk premium obtained from the website of Hao Zhou.
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Figure 4.1: Quantitative measures of company news flow - daily frequency
(a) Aggregate news tone level
(b) Aggregate news tone dispersion
Plotted are daily aggregates of news about US companies, retrieved from Thomson Reuters News Analytics
for the period 2003 - 2011. Definitions of daily aggregate news tone level and aggregate news tone dispersion
are discussed in Section 2 and are explicitly given in Eq. 4.2 and Eq. 4.3 respectively. Both time series are
shown in standardized form.
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Figure 4.2: Quantitative measures of company news flow - monthly frequency
(a) Aggregate news tone level
(b) Aggregate news tone dispersion
Plotted are monthly aggregates of news about US companies, retrieved from Thomson Reuters News Ana-
lytics for the period 2003 - 2011. Definitions of monthly aggregate news tone and aggregate dispersion of
news tone are discussed in Section 2 and are explicitly given in Eq. 4.4 and Eq. 4.5 respectively. Both time
series are shown in standardized form.
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Figure 4.3: Monthly measures of company news flow and the VIX
(a) Aggregate news tone level and the VIX
(b) Aggregate news tone dispersion and the VIX
Monthly measures of company news flow from Figure 4.2 are plotted (in blue, dashed line) against end-of-
month levels of the VIX (in green, solid line) for the period 2003 - 2011. Both time series are shown in
standardized form.
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Figure 4.4: Lead-Lag Analysis between News Tone and the Variance Risk Premium
(a) Aggregate level of news tone and the variance risk premium
(b) Aggregate dispersion of news tone and the variance risk premium
The figures present lead-lag correlations between measures of aggregate news tone and the variance risk
premium on S&P 500. The top figure presents correlations between the aggregate level of news tone and
the variance risk premium, where the variance risk premium is held fixed at time t while the news tone
measure is varied. For example, a lead/lag horizon of -5 refers to the correlation between aggregate level of
news tone at time t − 5 and the variance risk premium at time t. The bottom figure presents correlations
between the aggregate dispersion of news tone and the variance risk premium, where the variance risk
premium is held fixed at time t while the news tone measure is varied. For example, a lead/lag horizon
of -5 refers to the correlation between aggregate dispersion of news tone at time t − 5 and the variance
risk premium at time t. We consider lead/lag horizons of -12 months to +12 months. Time period is Jan
2003-Dec 2011.
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